

# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



*An American Quarterly  
Devoted to Russia  
Past and Present*

JANUARY  
1957

*Vol. 16, No. 1*

*Price \$1.25*

## *Contributors To This Issue*

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, Foreign Correspondent in Soviet Russia for the *Christian Science Monitor*, 1922-1933, is the author of well-known works on the Soviet Union and international affairs.

OLEG ANISIMOV is the author of a book on the cold war, *The Ultimate Weapon*, 1953, and is currently working on a new book on Soviet foreign policy.

LUDMILLA B. TURKEVICH, Lecturer in Russian at Princeton University and author of *Cervantes in Russia*, 1950, currently is a Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.

IVAN D. LONDON is Assistant Professor of Psychology at Brooklyn College and Director of the Inwood Project on Intercultural Communication; he has contributed articles on various aspects of Soviet science in scientific journals.

OLEG A. MASLENIKOV is Associate Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of California at Berkeley and author of *The Frenzied Poets*, 1952.

MICHAEL KARPOVICH is Professor of History and Curt Hugo Reisinger, Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Harvard University.

# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

*An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia  
Past and Present*

Vol. 16

JANUARY, 1957

No. 1

☆ ☆ ☆

Russia Under Western Eyes, <i>William Henry Chamberlin</i> ..	3
The New Orientation of Soviet Foreign Policy, <i>Oleg Anisimov</i> .....	13
Russian Women, <i>Ludmilla B. Turkevich</i> .....	24
A Note on Soviet Science, <i>Ivan D. London</i> .....	37
Russian Symbolists: The Mirror Theme and Allied Motifs, <i>Oleg A. Maslennikov</i> .....	42
The Chekhov Publishing House, <i>Michael Karpovich</i> .....	53

## BOOK REVIEWS

Russia Leaves the War, <i>by</i> George Kennan, <i>Max Beloff</i> ....	59
Russian Journey, <i>by</i> William O. Douglas; Moscow was My Parish, <i>by</i> George Bissonnette, <i>William Henry Chamberlin</i> .....	61
An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality, <i>by</i> Gerhardt Niemeyer and John Reshetar, Jr., <i>Warren B. Walsh</i> .....	63
Labor Policy in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1928, <i>by</i> Margaret De- war, <i>Solomon Schwarz</i> .....	63
Music Under the Soviets, <i>by</i> Andrey Olkhovsky, <i>Juri Jelagin</i> .....	65

*Continued on Page II*

The Soviet Secret Services, <i>by</i> Otto Heilbrunn, <i>Murray Polner</i> .....	67
The Russian Struggle for Power: 1914-1917, <i>by</i> Jay C. Smith, Jr., <i>Anatole G. Mazour</i> .....	69
America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920, <i>by</i> Betty M. Unterberger, <i>John Albert White</i> .....	71
Selected Works of Vasili Rozanov, <i>ed. by</i> George Ivask, <i>V. M.</i> .....	73

## THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt  
*Editor*

William Henry Chamberlin  
Michael Karpovich

Warren B. Walsh  
Alexis Wiren

---

The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

---

Copyright 1957 by the Russian Review, Inc., 235 Baker Library, Hanover N. H. Published quarterly in January, April, July and October. Entered as second class matter at the post office in Hanover, N. H., under the Act of March 3, 1897. Additional entry at the post office in Deep River, Conn. Subscription rates: \$5.00 a year in the United States; Canada \$5.50; foreign \$6.00; single issues through Vol. 12, \$1.00; subsequent single issues \$1.25. Cumulative Index to Vols. I-X (Nov. 1941, Oct. 1951), \$.75 per copy. The contents of this publication cannot be reprinted without permission of the editors. Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.



# *Russia Under Western Eyes*

BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

AMONG the novels of Joseph Conrad, Polish-born author who became a master of English prose style, is one entitled *Under Western Eyes*. The scene shifts between St. Petersburg and Geneva; the figures in the story are Russian revolutionaries, Tsarist officials, informers and double agents. The height of ironical tragedy is reached when the Russian student who has betrayed to his death an idealistic terrorist in Russia, almost becomes, himself, the accepted lover, in Geneva, of the sister of the man whom he has betrayed.

The narrator is a somewhat sceptical old-fashioned liberal English teacher, who sounds this note of warning to the devoted, enthusiastic girl whose brother has perished for the revolutionary cause:

"The scrupulous and the just, the noble, humane and devoted natures; the unselfish and the intelligent may begin a movement — but it passes away from them. They are not the leaders of a revolution. They are its victims: the victims of disgust, of disenchantment — often of remorse. Hopes grotesquely betrayed, ideals caricatured — that is the definition of revolutionary success."

This novel was published before the First World War. But in an Author's Note, dated 1926, Conrad specifically draws a conclusion that is implicit in his story: that a victory of revolutionary extremism over the extremism of autocracy will lead to no happy ending. To quote Conrad's own words:

"The ferocity and imbecility of an autocratic rule rejecting all legality and in fact basing itself upon complete moral anarchism provokes the no less imbecile and atrocious answer of a purely utopian revolutionism encompassing destruction by the first means to hand, in the strange conviction that a fundamental change of hearts must follow the downfall of any given

human institutions. These people are unable to see that all they can effect is merely a change of names. The oppressors and the oppressed are all Russians together; and the world is once more brought face to face with the truth of the saying that the tiger cannot change his stripes nor the leopard his spots."

Conrad was a Pole whose family suffered cruelly under Tsarist rule. His judgments are correspondingly harsh. But the title of his novel is descriptive of a process that has been going on for more than four centuries and that is still far from over: the impact of Russia, Tsarist and Soviet, on the Western observer.

Much has changed, in Russia and in the West, since the sixteenth century, when the observant Austrian diplomat, Baron Herberstein, made his way to the court of Tsar Vasily, the son of Ivan III, and when the intrepid British mariner, Richard Chancellor, blown into the port of Archangel, was conducted to the court of Ivan the Terrible and established the first contact between the emerging maritime power of Great Britain and the nascent land power of the Muscovite state. Yet there are also strong elements of continuity in travellers' tales about Russia, from the earliest chronicles to such recent visitors as the British Russian expert, Edward Crankshaw, and the French Socialist, André Philip.

Of course visitors to Russia like Herberstein and the early British envoys and merchants were not seeing Russia in the mirror of twentieth century democratic institutions. Methods of repression of heretics and rebels were ruthless in the West at that time. Yet it is suggestive that the Austrian Herberstein and the Englishman Giles Fletcher shared the impression of being in the presence of a governmental power far less subject to any kind of limitation than anything within their experience at home. Herberstein, in the course of some very interesting descriptions of life and customs in the Muscovite state, remarks:

"It is uncertain whether the roughness of the people demands a tyrant-ruler or whether this people became so rough and cruel as a result of the tyranny of the ruler."

Fletcher, who visited Russia in the latter half of the sixteenth

century, after the window at Archangel had been opened, writes:

"Their method of government is very similar to the Turkish, which they apparently try to imitate. Their government is purely tyrannical; all its activities are directed to the advantage and profit of the Tsar alone, and, moreover, in the most clear and barbarous fashion."

British visitors, already used to parliaments with control of the purse-strings and to some rudiments of legal procedure, are usually quick to set down as one of their first impressions the absence of security for persons and property in Russia. Chancellor reports that the Tsar made a practice of confiscating the wealth of nobles who were especially rich or who had grown old in service.

"And he (the nobleman) may not repine of that but must immediately say that he has nothing — it is God's and the Duke's<sup>1</sup> Grace's. He cannot say, as we the common people of England say, if we have anything, that it is God's and our own."

A later British visitor to Russia, William Richardson, discussing the time of the Empress Catherine II, reports:

"They have no trials by jury, and no Habeas Corpus Act. A person accused of crimes may be kept in prison forever; or, if he is brought to trial, he is not tried by his peers."

Herberstein and other early reporters on Russia note certain Oriental features of Russian life, a product probably of Tatar and Byzantine influences. The costumes of the boyars, or leading nobles, in this pre-Petrine period are the flowing robes of Asia, not the tighter fitting suits of Europe. Women of the upper classes were secluded as in Mohammedan countries. The system of government, with the absolute authority of the Tsar, unchecked by such limiting influences as hereditary privileges of the nobility, chartered rights of free cities, an independent church and embryonic parliaments, was also more Asiatic than European.

The sweeping innovations of Peter the Great eliminated some of these Oriental aspects of Russian life and imposed a bureau-

<sup>1</sup>Vasily was apparently also known by the older title of Grand Duke.

cratic system on the administration of the country. But the influence of Asiatic models on the character of the Russian empire remained.

The shrewd eye of Herberstein notes the practice (continued on a vast scale under the Soviet regime and very characteristic of Asiatic despotisms) of forcibly dispersing peoples in newly acquired territories and infiltrating these territories with natives of the Muscovite area. He also observes a trait that has survived until the present time: the Muscovites delay interminably and do not make preparations in time; but when they are ready to act they want to get over quickly whatever business is at hand. He and other visitors note the mixture of hospitality and suspicion with which foreigners are treated. If one may trust the records of the Muscovy Company, a British trading corporation organized to deal with Russia, the first Russian Ambassador at the British Court, named Nepey, displayed certain traits which are not unfamiliar in Soviet diplomats.

"We do not find the Ambassador now at last so conformable to reason as we had thought. He is very mistrustful and thinks every man will beguile him. Therefore, you have need to take heed how you have to do with him, or with any such, and to make your bargains plain, and to set them down in writing. For they be subtle people, and do not always speak the truth, and think other men to be like themselves."

With the passing of time, and especially after the Westernizing changes imposed by Peter the Great and the gradual emergence of an upper class that spoke French and other foreign languages, Russia became less alien and more approachable to foreign tourists. Comment becomes less uniformly critical; there are words of appreciation for the personalities of such sovereigns as Peter the Great and Catherine II, tributes to Peter's efforts to bring education and Western manners into a backward country.

Yet a sense of strangeness, of the oppressive weight of the state and the social and economic system remains. John Perry, a British engineer who served under Peter the Great, is impressed by the barbarous floggings which are inflicted "on both

lords and peasants" and notes that the person who is flogged must confess his guilt before the beating can stop and must also bow down and thank the person who administers the correction. Perhaps it would not be an undue exercise of imagination to see here the preview of Soviet political trials in the era of Stalin.<sup>2</sup>

William Richardson, a Scotch divine who was one of the most thoughtful British observers in Russia in the eighteenth century, emphasizes the brutalizing and deadening effect of serfdom on the majority of the population and the paralysis of individual initiative. At the same time he does not believe in the possibility of a successful, immediate, swift emancipation: "To give liberty at once to twenty millions of slaves would be to let loose on mankind so many robbers and spoilers."

Other points that impressed British travellers in Russia who went beyond surface observations were the corruption of the local administration and the heavy and arbitrary taxes, which prevented the normal development of trade and hampered the development of a middle class. There are frequent references to the Russian habit of hiding money instead of using it for investment. The engineer Perry tells how Peter the Great reduced the metal content of his currency, with disastrous results, for the payment of his troops and payment for ships which he had ordered abroad, "so that the Tsar's own immediate affairs have suffered their full share in this piece of ill conduct, as well as foreigners who have been wronged in their pay, and merchants and trade in general been injured thereby."

One of the more favorable British commentators on Russia was Sir Robert Thomas Wilson, an adventurous character who did not lack appreciation of his own real or imaginary achievements, who was a sort of roving British agent in Russia and saw service with Kutuzov in the war against Napoleon. In

<sup>2</sup>*Seven Britons in Imperial Russia*, edited by Peter Putnam (Princeton University Press, 1952) is an admirably edited condensed summary of the impressions of seven British visitors to Russia who published accounts of their impressions from 1698 until 1812. *The March of Muscovy*, by Harold Lamb (Doubleday, 1948) contains interesting excerpts from the impressions of European visitors to Russia in the sixteenth century.



his case enthusiasm for the Russians as allies in a struggle against a mighty adversary outweighed any negative impressions of the Tsarist political and social order.

A striking reaction to Russia under Nicholas I is that of the French Marquis de Custine, whose experience was an amusing preview of that of many Leftist admirers of Soviet theory who were horrified, after they actually saw Russia, at what they found in practice. The Marquis might be called a parlor White, — before he saw what hundred percent absolutism could be. Two of his ancestors had perished on the guillotine during the French Revolution and he went to St. Petersburg and Moscow, as he says, “in search of arguments against representative government.” He left with a sense of shock and horror, finding Russia enslaved at home and potentially aggressive abroad. His book<sup>3</sup> is full of vehement and incisive judgments on what he considered the bound society where the ruler wielded so much more power than any European monarch; his final reaction might be summarized, in his own words, as follows:

“It is necessary to have lived in this solitude without rest, in this prison without leisure, that is called Russia in order to be conscious of all the freedom one enjoys in the other countries of Europe, whatever form of government they may have adopted. When your son is discontented in France, use my formula, say to him: ‘Go to Russia.’”

A more temperate, but shrewd and caustic observer of the Court of Tsar Nicholas I was the American Minister, Neill S. Brown, whose despatches rank among the livelier items in the United States diplomatic archives. Mr. Brown’s impressions are perhaps most strikingly summarized in a despatch dated St. Petersburg, January 28, 1852:

“The position of a Minister here is far from being pleasant. The opinion prevails that no communication, at least of a public nature, is safe in the Post-office, but is opened and inspected as a matter of course. Hence those Legations that can afford it maintain regular couriers and never send anything by mail. The opinion also pre-

<sup>3</sup>An abridged version of Custine’s voluminous journals is available in English, translated by Phyllis Penn Kohler, under the title *Journey for Our Time* (Pellegrini and Cudahy, 1951).

vails that Ministers are constantly subjected to a system of espionage, and that even their servants are made to disclose what passed in their households, their conversations, associations, etc. . . . Nothing is made public that is worth knowing. You will find no two individuals agreeing in the strength of the army and navy, in the amount of the public debt, or the annual revenue. In my opinion it is not intended by the Government that these things should be known."

Widening cultural horizons and opportunities for historical research in the nineteenth century made possible the appearance of the solid, detailed studies of the Russian Empire by the French scholar and Slav specialist, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, and the British Mackenzie Wallace. Of these two works, for a long time considered standard studies of Russia, that of Leroy-Beaulieu contains more general ideas, that of Mackenzie Wallace more discursive firsthand observation and description. It was Leroy-Beaulieu who saw a key to Russia's strangeness "under Western Eyes" in the fact that this vast nation almost entirely escaped the impact of three great influences which affected Western Europe: the Renaissance, the Reformation and the French Revolution.

Among other Western commentators the British Stephen Graham, in *The Way of Martha and The Way of Mary*, offered a sympathetic mystical interpretation of the significance of Russian Orthodoxy. The American George Kennan, a great-uncle of the living scholar-diplomat of the same name, revealed hard conditions of prison labor in Siberia.

The bibliography of works on Russia since the Revolution far exceeds in quantity, although probably not in quality, all books on the subject written in earlier centuries. Now Russia was not only a country, vastly enhanced in significance by the Second World War, but the experimental station of a radically new system in politics, economics, philosophy, and morals. This accounts for a tremendous intensification of interest. Russia has become a synonym of Communism; and since 1917 many books on Russia have been pegs on which to hang arguments for or against Communism.

Of early controversial books on the Russian Revolution John Reed's *Ten Days that Shook the World*, an American radical's



sympathetic description of the Bolshevik seizure of power, is still read for its vivid style, despite some inevitable historical slips. John Spargo's highly critical *Bolshevism* is gathering dust on library shelves.

A Marquis de Custine in reverse, although with a milder negative reaction, was Bertrand Russell, British philosopher, who went to Russia in 1920 thinking himself a Communist and left convinced that he was not. One of the big Communist propaganda triumphs was *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Their eminence as social scientists and their carefully documented studies of British social and economic conditions (some of which were translated into Russian by Lenin and his wife, Krupskaya) produced for this work a reputation which it did not deserve, in view of the authors' naive acceptance of Soviet official statements.

The tone of many postwar books about Russia was predetermined by the author's personal political and economic sympathies; and here there was a remarkable shift of attitudes between Right and Left. Before the Revolution people of socialist, radical and liberal sympathies were usually most unsparing in their criticisms of the Tsarist regime. Conservatives, without, as a rule, idealizing Tsarist conditions, were sceptical about desirable revolutionary alternatives and were more inclined to emphasize Russia's importance as a potential ally and market.

After the Revolution it was often socialists and other leftists who were inclined to deny or at least apologize for and minimize the cruelties of the Soviet regime, while conservatives took the lead in denouncing its oppressive features. This attitude was not universal; some of the most bitter indictments of Soviet practice have been written by such disillusioned former Communists or Communist sympathizers as Arthur Koestler, Eugene Lyons, and Max Eastman.

The propaganda magnetism of Communism found its reflection in fellow-traveler literature, in books written for the purpose of glorifying the Soviet system and denouncing all criticism of it as the work of malice, reaction and ignorance. There is

no equivalent for books of this type in the writing about pre-revolutionary Russia.

Because of the special conditions of Soviet life, there is a lamentable lack of books written with a background of firsthand experience of Soviet living conditions. Foreigners in the Soviet Union, whether journalists and diplomats stationed in the country for long periods of time or short-term visitors, have at best a secondhand knowledge of the every day life of the Soviet worker, peasant, or office worker. Two exceptions to this generalization, two books with a genuine "grassroots" feel of Soviet life, are John Scott's *Behind the Urals* (Houghton Mifflin) and Markoosha Fischer's *My Lives in Moscow* (Harper). John Scott is an American who, as a young man, got employment as a skilled worker in the Soviet steel mill of Magnitogorsk. Russian-born Markoosha Fischer, wife of the correspondent and author, Louis Fischer, lived for almost two decades as a Moscow housewife, on a Russian, not a foreign basis.

In many cases Soviet Russia has been seen "under Western eyes" against the background of that characteristic Soviet institution, the slave labor camp. The literature on this subject is voluminous; one can only mention a few of the more coherent and vivid accounts: Elinor Lipper's *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps* (Regnery); *Vorkuta*, by Joseph Scholmer (Holt); *A World Apart*, by Gustav Herling (Roy); *Life and Death in Soviet Russia*, by El Campesino (a Republican military leader in the Spanish civil war) (Putnam); *The Accused*, by Alexander Weissberg; *Conducted Tour*, by Ada Halperin (Sheed and Ward).

The horrors and even the reality of Soviet forced labor in concentration camps have been denied by Soviet official statements, reinforced by fellow-travelers and Soviet apologists. These denials do not weigh very heavily in the scales of probability against the detailed stories of large numbers of foreigners, to say nothing of many Russians, who survived the experience of imprisonment in these camps.

Political circumstances have sometimes affected the tone of writing about Soviet Russia. The war created an atmosphere

very favorable to Communist sympathizers. There was an unwritten ban on the publication of unfavorable books, broken by William L. White's candid *Report on the Russians* (Harcourt Brace). Although this seems very moderate in retrospect, especially in the light of Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin in his private speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, its publication during the war brought down a tirade of vituperation on author and publisher,— a measure of the strength of Communist sympathy at that time.

With the advent of the cold war the tone of most books about the Soviet Union became distinctly less favorable. Firsthand eyewitness reporting became almost impossible because of Stalin's policy of admitting to Russia very few foreigners and subjecting these to the closest surveillance and the most severe restrictions on travel and contact with Russians.

Since 1953 these restrictions have been relaxed and a considerable number of foreigners have visited the Soviet Union. Much greater relaxation will be needed, however, before the facts of Soviet life can be investigated as thoroughly as living conditions in Western countries.

And there will always be the problem summed up in the phrase "under Western eyes": a difficulty, for Westerners, of understanding the true inner content of a country that was always somewhat set apart from Europe by historical conditions and experience and which underwent the further influence of a mighty revolution directed in many ways against Western values and traditions.

# *The New Orientation of Soviet Foreign Policy*

BY OLEG ANISIMOV

ONE of the shrewdest of the old Bolsheviks, Mikoyan, described the guiding principles of Soviet foreign policy as follows:

"Our policy is based upon an evaluation of the specific, concrete characteristics of a given situation, on an assessment of the actual relationship of forces, on an accurate appraisal of the differences and shades of the policies of various countries at a given period of time, primarily with regard to the question with which we are most concerned — the question of the struggle for peace."<sup>1</sup>

I have never come across a more succinct and better definition of Soviet foreign policy. What Mikoyan said in so many words was that the strategical over-all objective of Soviet foreign policy is the pursuit of durable security and that within this over-all framework Moscow uses a highly differentiated and flexible policy adjusted to the "political-psychological" realities of the individual country with which it deals.

Since the flexible and varied character of Soviet foreign policy constitutes one of its main strengths, it is very important to understand how Moscow applies in actual practice the guiding principles which Mikoyan described as the basis of Soviet policy. In the following pages an attempt is made to examine how these general principles operate with respect to the non-Communist countries.

Most of the Bolsheviks who came to power in Russia in 1917

<sup>1</sup>This definition was given by Mikoyan in a major speech delivered at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., in February, 1956. Mikoyan made it clear that the peace he had in mind was a *durable* peace.

were convinced that the capitalist world was ripe for revolution, and that the economic contradictions inherent (according to Marx) in the capitalist system were pushing all the capitalist countries of the Western world in the direction of proletarian revolutions. This assumption turned out to be fallacious. The proletarian revolutions did not materialize. Instead of merely reaping the fruits of matured capitalism, the Bolsheviks were confronted with the task of preparing the ground for proletarian revolutions abroad while building up Soviet strength.

This turned out to be not only a very difficult task but also one which could not be mastered through the application of orthodox Marxist philosophy. Developments in Europe between the First and Second World Wars showed, for example, that the revolutionary unrest caused by economic distress was not necessarily international in nature; in Germany and many other European countries the revolutionary discontent caused by economic hardship was exploited by the nationalist leaders who succeeded in pre-empting the leadership of the local Communists, and they adopted a policy hostile to the Kremlin and its goals.

Under the impact of these events and also under the influence of the great changes wrought by technological advance in the structure of international relations and the "political psychology" of nations, the political philosophy on which Moscow based its strategy underwent a profound change and gradually evolved into a psychologically-oriented doctrine which could be described as an up-to-date version of Trotsky's "permanent revolution" adjusted to the nuclear age. In brief outline this doctrine can be described as follows:

The great changes which are taking place under the impact of rapid and revolutionary technological advances are reflected in changes of corresponding magnitude in the "political-psychology" of nations. This process produces a profound cleavage between those who realize that the times call for immense readjustments in the structure of national states and the nature of international relations and those who want to preserve the traditional values, i.e. primarily the members of the ruling élite in

the so-called capitalist countries. While such a cleavage between the rulers and the ruled has existed in all times, the ever-accelerating tempo of the technological revolution causes a *continually increasing* time-lag between the rapid transformation of the "political psychology" of the masses throughout the world and the sluggish evolution of the political, social, and economic structure of the non-Communist world. This is why our era is the most revolutionary era in history:

"The tempo of life has quickened. So, too, has the tempo of events following hard upon each other's heels. It is not only technology that is advancing with seven-league strides; history, too, has adopted the same pace."<sup>2</sup>

The appearance of a continued and increasing time-lag between "political psychology" and political realities is a global process, manifesting itself in the national developments within individual countries as well as in international affairs. It operates on several planes of human consciousness. In some areas it takes the shape of impatience with the inability of governments to satisfy *promptly* the desire of the masses for a good life and social justice. By having brought "plenty of everything for everyone" within the realm of the feasible, technology has made poverty remediable and therefore intolerable. In other regions the gap between a revolutionary psyche and conservative politics takes the shape of a strong revulsion against the old methods of handling international affairs. By having equated war with the physical annihilation of the human race, technology has made such traditional concepts of international relations as peace maintenance through a delicate balance of power tantamount to the perpetuation of life on a volcano. In still other areas, especially in those countries which have only recently gained independence, dissatisfaction with existing conditions takes the shape of an urge to achieve power as soon as possible, in order to "get even" with the oppressors of yesterday. By having enabled a country possessing advanced industry and modern weapons to stand up to virtually the entire world, technology has put an enormous emotional premium on rapid indus-

<sup>2</sup>Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 1, 1956, p.5.



trialization. Often all three kinds of impatience are present in varying degree in a given country. The world, in brief, is in turmoil, and men are striving towards gigantic goals which they want to achieve almost overnight. They seek a short-cut through history. The Communists tell us they "have the know-how" and offer to suit action to words.

The basic premises of the strategic concept outlined above represent what may be called a political philosophy. This philosophy serves as a guide for action. On the following pages I shall give a few examples showing how this concept is applied and why it has proved, in many instances, more effective than Western policies in wooing nations.

Thoughtful analysts of Soviet policies often attribute many successes of the Communists and their appeal in certain areas of the world to the fact that Communists exploit real grievances and issues. This is doubtless true. But Communist strength lies not in its opportunistic tactics, but in the strategy of playing those "political-psychological" cards which possess a tremendous inherent dynamism. Sometimes they have failed to diagnose correctly what these forces were (for example, when they assumed between the First and Second World Wars that internationalism was a stronger force than nationalism). But they have always adhered to the maxim that to govern is to foresee, and sought to identify the goals of the Soviet Union (and hence of world Communism) with what they regarded as the wave of the future. This is as true today as it was twenty years ago, when Stalin attributed Communist successes to the fact that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union identified itself with "those strata which were developing and had a future before them, even though they did not constitute the predominant force" at the time when Soviet Communists threw in their lot with those strata.<sup>3</sup> More than ten years earlier he had warned "the rulers of the West and the East" that failure to take into account the tremendous dynamism of the revolutionary forces in China would have dire consequences for those who ignored

<sup>3</sup>*History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, p. 411.



the fact that the future belonged to these dynamic forces, and emphasized that "we, as a state, cannot but take these forces into account."<sup>4</sup>

Soviet policy on the question of international security, peace, and disarmament offers a contemporary example of how this strategy operates. A comparison between the manner in which the United States and the Soviet Union approach these problems offers an impressive example of the extent to which Moscow relies on "psychology" in its handling of international affairs, and how successful this method is apt to be, not merely as propaganda, but as an instrument for attaining political objectives.

When the invention of atomic weapons conjured up a threat to man's survival, the American government started a search for ways and means of bringing them under control. It made a number of proposals. All were based on the traditional American method of handling political problems: the proposals were "functional" in nature, i.e. aimed at the enactment of international laws and the establishment of agencies and instruments for continued control of the atomic (and later, hydrogen) bombs. When it became clear that the Soviet Union would not cooperate in the establishment of a security system acceptable to the United States, pessimism settled over Washington so far as the problem of durable peace and disarmament was concerned. American diplomats confined themselves in the following years to discussing with Soviet diplomats some of the aspects of international inspection and to stressing the need for a show of goodwill on the part of the U.S.S.R. as a pre-requisite to any concrete agreement on disarmament. President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal was the most spectacular move made by the United States in recent years on the disarmament question.

By contrast, Moscow approaches the problem of peace and disarmament on an entirely different plane: that of "political psychology," and in terms of its traditional orientation towards the future. The reaction of Washington to the Communist at-

<sup>4</sup>Joseph Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. 1, p. 379.

tempt at seeking further territorial expansion by "small wars" in Korea, appears to have alerted Soviet rulers to the danger of pushing Americans too far. After what appears to have been some fumbling and a "great debate" on foreign policy (which cannot be discussed here for want of space), Moscow has evolved a strategy aimed at exploiting for political purposes the impact which the invention of weapons of mass annihilation has made upon the "political psychology" of nations. The rationale behind the new strategy appears to be as follows:

The growing destructiveness of weapons of mass annihilation is bound to intensify throughout the world the fear of all-out war and opposition to the use (at least the strategic use) of weapons of mass annihilation. This is the great force "which is developing and has a future before it." The growing fear of all-out war can be made to promote Soviet goals, if the U.S.S.R. prepares in advance to exploit the opportunities offered by the mounting anxiety experienced by nations at the prospect of an apocalyptic cataclysm. These opportunities will take one of two possible forms.

If opposition to all-out war spreads to the United States, the Soviet Union in alliance with China will be ultimately able to resume the "brilliantly successful policy of administering [its] aggression to [its] victims in successive doses nicely calculated to be, each time, just large enough for a docile patient to swallow,"<sup>5</sup> which Moscow pursued with great success in the early postwar years in central and eastern Europe. The preponderance of the Communist bloc in terms of manpower, its experience in political warfare, the growth of neutralism among America's allies, and the following which the Soviet Union has outside its boundaries will give the Communist bloc a clear advantage over the United States, if the widening realization that recourse to nuclear and thermo-nuclear war has ceased to be a possible policy, finally forcing Washington to abandon its present reliance on "massive retaliation" as a means of stopping local Communist aggressions.

<sup>5</sup>Arnold Toynbee in his *A Study of History* (Vol. 9) described in these words Hitler's early policy in Europe.

On the other hand, if the United States continues to rely on massive deterrents as the principal means of stopping a further expansion of the Communist-ruled area, the mounting tide of fear of annihilation is likely to intensify among America's allies the urge to seek survival by extricating themselves from military alliances which keep them living on a volcano. If the growing yearning of nations for *lasting* peace continues to be inhibited in consequence of the inability of the Communist and non-Communist blocs to agree on a security system, neutrality may come to be increasingly regarded by America's allies as the only practicable "short-cut" to survival. This is what Moscow tries to impress upon them. In a sense, therefore, "massive retaliation" may be welcome to Moscow; although it continues to make further territorial expansion impossible without overwhelming risks, it intensifies throughout the world the fear of war, and thus paves the way for a Communist break-through on the "political-psychological" front. Soviet propaganda agencies spare no effort to publicize throughout the world "massive retaliation" and its real or hypothetical implications for everyone.

Moscow thus entertains simultaneously two strategical concepts for combating the United States: a plan for reducing the area under American influence by a limited war and a plan for achieving the same goal by an offensive on the "political-psychological" plane. If the break-through succeeds, it will result in an actual decrease in the number of troops, planes, and guns at the disposal of Washington.

It is improbable that the U.S.S.R. will attempt a limited expansion by military means as long as such an attempt is likely to meet with "massive retaliation." But there is considerable evidence that the possibility of resuming at some future date a policy of limited expansion continues to be entertained by Russia's rulers. According to the information of American military experts, Soviet offensive military doctrines are keyed today to "massive guerilla warfare in the enemy's rear, featured by extensive sabotage and uprisings by Communist fifth colum-

nists.”<sup>6</sup> These are typical small-war tactics aimed at *rapid* victory. At the Twentieth Communist Party Congress held in February, 1956, Khrushchev stressed that socialist ideas had gained such a hold upon nations that the transition from Capitalism to Communism could now be achieved by peaceful means. Mikoyan, on the other hand, made it clear that, whereas such peaceful evolution was possible in certain cases, “in other cases . . . the bourgeoisie . . . will surely foist upon the proletariat an armed struggle in an effort to preserve its domination, and the proletariat must be prepared in advance for it.”<sup>7</sup> This means in plain Russian, that the Soviet rulers expect armed conflicts between the Communists and the non-Communists in various parts of the world, and that Moscow is preparing for this contingency in advance.

To assume that Khrushchev’s and Mikoyan’s statements reflected a difference of opinion among the top leaders about future developments, is, I think, to take an overly-simple view of the operation of Soviet foreign policy. Moscow does have two alternative strategic concepts, both of which are based on an evaluation of the impact which the technological revolution has — and is likely to have in the coming years — on the “political psychology” of nations.

In the last two years the world has witnessed a spectacular increase of Soviet economic activities outside the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has concluded trade agreements with, and offered economic help to, scores of nations. This is often regarded as evidence that Russia’s rulers consider economic activities today as their main weapon in their fight against capitalism. I believe the contrary to be true. Stalin’s successors have never displayed the same confidence that economics, as such, automatically favor Soviet goals, which was characteristic of Stalin’s world-view. In the assessment of the trend of international developments which Stalin published six months before his death, he made sweeping prognostications about the inevitability of

<sup>6</sup>Hanson Baldwin, “The Soviet’s Strength — III,” *The New York Times*, March 28, 1956.

<sup>7</sup>*Pravda*, February 18, 1956.

new wars between capitalist countries. According to him, this development was made inevitable by the insoluble economic contradictions inherent in the capitalist system.

By contrast, his successors clearly do not believe in the existence of a "closed system," i.e., in a deterministic philosophy, which makes any political development "unavoidable." At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, Khrushchev described the economic developments within the capitalist system as "unsound," "irregular," "unsteady"; but he never suggested that these weaknesses of the capitalistic system would inevitably lead to its collapse. Mikoyan went even further and pointed out in his speech that Stalin had "failed to explain the complicated and contradictory phenomena within modern capitalism and the growth of capitalist production in many [capitalist] countries."<sup>8</sup> Still more significant in this respect was Khrushchev's statement on the nature of war: "War is not an exclusively economic phenomenon. The relationship of classes and political forces, the degree of their organization, and the conscious will of the people have great relevance to the question whether or not a war breaks out. Still more: under certain conditions the struggle of the advanced social and political forces may play a decisive role in this question."<sup>9</sup> These and similar statements made in the post-Stalin era by Soviet top leaders suggest that Stalin's successors have not only abandoned his adherence to a "closed system," but have also subordinated economics to "political psychology" ("the conscious will of the people").

In planning Soviet foreign policies, Stalin appears to have let himself be guided by the assumption that economic developments within the capitalist world were inherently propitious to Communist goals, and that it was more expedient to spend money on such "auxiliary" activities as propaganda and subversion. The relationship has now become reversed: the present Soviet leaders treat economics as an auxiliary of "political psychology," as *one* of the means of fostering within the countries of the non-Communist world that impatience with the *status*

<sup>8</sup>*Pravda*, February 18, 1956.

<sup>9</sup>*Pravda*, February 15, 1956.



*quo* which they seek to promote throughout the non-Communist world in an effort to intensify peoples' willingness to take a short-cut through history.

Soviet assistance to Afghanistan offers one of the most typical illustrations of the method used by Moscow for fostering revolutionary unrest by extending economic assistance. Most of the projects carried out by the Soviet Union under the assistance program to Afghanistan are concentrated in the country's capital, Kabul. Since Afghanistan is a kind of Asian version of the ancient city-state, the modern buildings and installations erected in Kabul by Soviet engineers and technicians must make the population of the entire country reflect upon the unnatural contrast between the rapid modernization of the capital and the medieval conditions prevailing throughout the country, and must make the people impatient for a rapid and spectacular transition from the Middle Ages to the nuclear age. There is, indeed, strong evidence that this is the psychological effect which Soviet assistance is making in Afghanistan, especially the Afghan intelligentsia.

Similarly, Soviet assistance to Egypt strongly suggests that it is planned on a "political-psychological" basis and is aimed at: 1. Catering to the militaristic and over-ambitious moods and plans which jeopardize Egypt's economy and cannot but lead to ultimate disillusionment and greater dependence on the Communist bloc, and 2. Helping with short-range projects which will not raise the nation's living standards but will demonstrate to the Egyptian people the amazing achievements of modern science and technology.

Soviet assistance to many other non-Communist countries bears the stamp of a similar psychological calculation behind it.

This analysis of the philosophy upon which Soviet rulers base their foreign policy in respect to non-Communist countries offers no more than a broad outline of basic principles and strategy. In practice, this philosophy is applied in a highly differentiated way; thus Moscow handles its relations with India with quite different methods than its relations with Western Germany. As Mikoyan has said, Soviet foreign policy is conducted on the

basis of "an accurate appraisal of the differences and shades of differences in the policies of various countries at a given period of time." Yet, I believe, that the most important facts about Soviet foreign policy today are first, that it is conducted within a realistic, and not a doctrinaire over-all framework which imparts to it a high degree of cohesiveness without depriving it of realism, and second, that Moscow is guided in its policy-planning by an effort to assess the main, long-range impact which the technological revolution is likely to have on men's "political psychology" on various planes of human consciousness and in various geopolitical settings.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup>The manner in which Moscow has handled the revolt in the satellites strongly suggests that Soviet *defensive* strategy is today also slanted towards psychology. A comparison between the tactic used in Poland and in Hungary indicates that Moscow is prepared to go much further than did Stalin in trying to satisfy popular aspirations, but that present Soviet leaders appear as determined as was Stalin not to yield on any point involving the substance of Soviet power. The re-orientation of Soviet foreign policy thus means a shrewder and more flexible policy. But it does not mean the abandonment either of the totalitarian substance of the regime or of the traditional *Machtpolitik*.



# *Russian Women*

BY LUDMILLA B. TURKEVICH

THE role of women as members of society has always been eclipsed by the more spectacular role of men. Even in the West, women have always lived in the penumbra of masculine achievements: man is the war hero, the illustrious statesman, the genius of discovery, invention, beaux arts. But while prudently and tactfully bowing to the tradition of man's superiority, women have gradually won ever-increasing recognition for their contributions to this world of ours.

The accomplishments of the Occidental woman are well known to us all, but what about her Eastern counterpart? What about the women on the other side of the globe, in Russia? The Russian women have also done some very effective in-fighting, by virtue of which they, too, have assumed an increasingly important position in their society. In order to survey this process, let us consider the most famous feminine exponents of Russian art, letters, science, and technology, and glance at the far more numerous ranks of skilled and unskilled industrial and agricultural workers.

Significantly, the prime impetus to the cultural development of modern Russia was given by a woman — Empress Catherine the Great (1729-1796). By imperial decree she placed arts and letters in the hands of native Russians. She herself set an example to her countrymen by studying and translating foreign masters of literature, especially drama, and by writing plays for her court theater. Despite the mediocrity of her own dramatic efforts, Catherine's role in the founding of the Russian theater, ballet, music, and other aspects of art was great. It led to the early nineteenth-century displacement of importations by native works and performers, who in the ballet, opera, and the legitimate stage achieved a lasting and high degree of excellence. Women as well as men won laurels in all these fields. The names

of Anna Pavlova, Vera Fokine, Bronislawa Nijinska, Tamara Toumanova of the Soviet Union, and the actress, Olga Knipper-Chekhov, are only a few of the many famous women of the Russian stage.

Women writers, on the other hand, are a comparatively recent phenomenon in Russia, which did not have this tradition of the Western literatures. English letters are rich in such gifted writers as Jane Austen, the Brontës, Mrs. Gaskell, George Eliot, and Mrs. Woolf. France can boast of a long line of brilliant women such as Mme de Lafayette, Mme de Sevigny, Mme de Staël, George Sand, and the less talented but more numerous generation of the end of the nineteenth century. Even Spain can point to Fernan Caballero, Pardo Bazan, and several poets. Yet, prior to the end of the nineteenth century, Russian literature was practically a masculine monopoly.

In the nineteenth century, the Russian women of education, breeding, and intelligence were accustomed to remain in the background, serving as mentors and assistants to their gifted sons and husbands, or as hostesses of literary salons of the type held in France by Madame de Recamier. Madame Smirnov, for example, whose soirées in St. Petersburg were attended weekly by such guests as the poet Pushkin, the novelist Gogol, the scholar Sobolevsky, and the musician Glinka, was instrumental in bringing together the greatest living cultural elements of Russia. Other famous soirées were held in Moscow by the Elagins, the Sverbeevs, Khomyakovs, Chaadaevs, and Karolina Pavlova. In the second half of the century, Countess Rastopchin and Tatyana Shchepkina-Kupernik tried their hand at writing poetry, but their work could not compete with that of their contemporaries and has not survived the test of time.

It was not until the turn of the century that a vigorous and brilliant woman claimed her place in the top echelons of Russian writers. She was Zinaida Hippus (1869-1945), wife of the more famous but less talented author Dimitri Merezhkowsky, who is known abroad for his historical novels *Leonardo da Vinci*, *Death of the Gods*, and *Peter and Alexis*. A Symbolist poet of rare talent, subtlety, and refinement, Hippus also became an

aggressive leader of the late nineteenth-century aesthetic revolt against the positivism and utilitarianism then in vogue. She was a highly versatile writer who penned short stories, long novels, plays, critical and political articles with equal ease and power. Though her intellectuality and imagination illuminated the whole of her many-sided achievement, poetry was her best medium. At first, in 1905, Hippius was a fervent revolutionary and an enthusiastic worker for the cause, but by 1917 she had undergone a change of heart and left Russia for voluntary exile in Paris, where she died.

Hippius was soon followed by a younger group of women writers — Marina Tsvetaeva (+1941), Anna Akhmatova (1888-), and Marietta Shaginyan. The first two were poets and the last began her career as a Symbolist poet but later turned to prose and is still active in the Soviet Union as a novelist. Tsvetaeva was primarily interested in the tricks and forms of literary writing, an experimenter rather than a perfectionist. Anna Akhmatova, on the other hand, was a perfectionist. She championed "art for art's sake," and this was to cause her much trouble, for such a stand was regarded as "bourgeois" and consequently hostile to Socialist Realism and the Soviet Union.

The recent war brought to fruition the talents of three gifted women — Verba Inber, Olga Bergholts, and Margarita Aliger. Inber (1890-) started her literary career in 1911 under the influence of the Symbolist Blok, then tacked from one orientation to another and finally joined the safe ranks of the government-approved Socialist Realists. World War II found her, as well as Akhmatova, Bergholts, and the novelist Ketlinskaya, in Leningrad. As they did, Inber lent her talents and strength to the besieged city; now writing for the Red Army paper, now broadcasting, now digging trenches, now helping the wounded. During her stay there, she wrote deeply moving poems about the bravery of the people at the front and in the rear, describing the great and small events and episodes of the siege. The most stirring work of the lyric poet Olga Bergholts (b. 1910) also dealt with the miseries of this city and its people under fire.

Aliger (b. 1915) is best known for her war poem "Zoya,"

which tells in a profoundly touching way the tragic story of the remarkable Communist girl, only in her teens, who was inhumanly tortured and hanged by the Germans near Moscow in 1941. Her image of Zoya became a heroic symbol to all Russians in their moment of greatest travail, in much the same manner that Konstantin Simonov's poem "Wait for Me" became a source of consolation and hope to the war-ravaged people at home and at the front.

The impact of war on both poetry and prose is a powerful thing indeed. Out of the comradeship and danger and adversity beginners emerge as writers of talent; talented authors reach the realm of true creative fiction; genius springs full blown. Even in an environment of complete regimentation such as the U.S.S.R. in wartime, genius could soar unhampered on the wings of patriotic song or lament in grief and desolation. Poets made their moving comment on the events that shook the world, but after the war what? The Soviet poets today seem to find life so bleak and prosaic that the embers of their poetic inspiration are dying away. The calibre of Inber's, Bergholts', and Akhmatova's postwar work has definitely dropped.

The novelists, however, are still publishing novels about the war. The genre, it is true, is very time-consuming. Whereas a poem may be composed in a short time, writing a novel of several hundred pages is a long drawn-out process and this may account, to a certain extent, for the fact that Soviet war novels are still appearing today. Yet, there is another side to the question. The Soviet Union regards the political intentions of the United States with much suspicion, and, it would seem, the regime is fostering in its people an attitude that would be emotionally receptive to war, should it occur. Although World War II has long ceased, the Soviets continue to publish numbers of tragic war novels and keep alive personal memories of painful wartime experiences. They continue to rub salt in the wounds of their people — lest they forget what war means. They conjure up from the store of memory the evil image of the hated German enemy and then cleverly cause it to "fade out" into an image of Uncle Sam. They present a fresh menace of war to an emotion-

ally excited people and whisper that this new threat is, in effect, the same one that brought about the anguish and desolation of a decade ago.

Some of the better novels dealing with the last war have been written by women, including Wanda Wasilewska (*Rainbow*, 1942; *Just Love*, 1944; *Rivers Are Burning*, 1953), V. Ketlinskaya (*In Siege*, 1949), V. Panova (*Factory*, 1948; *Traveling Companions*, 1947), E. Katerli (*The Stozharov's*, 1950), and A. Koptyaeva (*Friendship*, 1955). The most dynamic and colorful of these writers is Wanda Lvovna Wasilewska (b. 1905). She is the daughter of a Polish publicist and politician, and the wife of the leading Ukrainian dramatist, A. Korneichuk. She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Cracow, and was a deputy to the first and third meetings of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. During the war she was a regiment commissar on the southwestern front and engaged in extensive newspaper writing. In 1943, she became an organizer of the Polish army in the U.S.S.R., and during the following year served as deputy president of the Committee for the national liberation of Poland. In 1948 Wasilewska received the Stalin prize for her work *Just Love*, and was a member of the Presidium of the Second Congress of Writers held in 1954. In her spare time she has written many works of fiction and collaborated with her husband in writing plays. Her war novels, such as *Rainbow*, contain excruciatingly moving pictures of the horrors perpetrated by the invading hordes. Only a woman can sense the utter bestiality in such scenes as the one in which a woman in labor is caught in the vise formed by two sadistically taunting flanks of brutish fascist soldiers. Only a woman can convey the whole agony of such a situation. One never forgets this episode or many others like it in her books.

In *Siege* by Vera Ketlinskaya (born 1906), also leaves indelible memories with the reader. This novel, which was awarded a Stalin prize in 1948, is a remarkable document of the Leningrad ordeal of 1941-43. Ketlinskaya takes the reader through alarms, raids, encirclements, escapes. She leads one through factories, bombed telephone exchanges, broken homes, desert-



ed-looking streets under fire, and mud-filled trenches. Punch-drunk fighters, ravaged partisans, exhausted civilian auxiliary forces, hungry and weakened dwellers of the city fill the spectral atmosphere with the sound of their shuffling feet and muted whispers.

This is a novel about Vera, Lyuba, Liza, Maria and their friends and menfolk. It is also a story of hope, faith, and love for the motherland. Ketlinskaya plays down the individuality of her characters and highlights their common motivation. They all act according to the same pattern and strive for the same goal, the eviction of the invader. Individuals are submerged in the collective agony and all move along the path of tireless effort, of resistance to the enemy at whatever cost. Death is an ever-present reality to them all. There is, for example, Kocharyan, a soldier just dismissed from the hospital. He has learned that his young wife was killed during an air raid and that his little boy is in a children's home:

When Kocharyan came out of the hospital gates into the street and the frosty air filled his lungs, he sat down right there on the little bench that stood at the gate. And there he sat for a few minutes motionless, like someone out of breath. This was not the effect of the air: he had already taken walks in the hospital court. This was not weakness: he felt perfectly well. But the freedom, absolute freedom for a whole day with which he had no notion what to do, this overwhelmed him.

Slowly he went towards his former home. It was quiet in the street. No trams. No cars. Only one truck passed him. From under the tarpaulin covering twisted, rigid arms and legs stuck out. In back, leaning exhaustedly against the corpses, sat the workers with their shovels. Nobody, nobody except Kocharyan, followed this terrible truck with even a gaze. People, stepping uncertainly, looked down at their feet.

Kocharyan goes to the location where he once lived and there meets a woman he knows. He asks for his very small son, then he asks about his wife.

"Where did they bury her?" he asked.

The woman glanced at him with reproach and shook her head.

"You're not going there, are you? On foot! Here we can't even get our corpses taken over there . . . They throw them out into the street . . . Why go? What for? And besides, at the cemeteries these

days . . . Don't go!" she concluded firmly and withdrew toward the gate without so much as a farewell.

"Where did they bury her?" Kocharyan called to her.

"Lord!" exclaimed the woman, turning with irritation. "I have already told you . . ." But she saw Kocharyan's blazing eyes and quickly said, "On the Volkov, my dear, yes, on the Volkov . . .," and almost ran through the passageway.

He walked for more than an hour in the direction of the cemetery, and the nearer he came to it, the oftener he caught up with and overtook pedestrians harnessed to sleds, bearing corpses tightly and expertly shrouded in sheets, blankets, pieces of calico and mats. The corpses at first seemed to him to be children, but then he understood that it was their emaciation that had made them smaller, drier. The sleds were pulled almost exclusively by women. Their gait was severe, stubborn, their faces — stony.

On the street leading to the cemetery gates, the flow of sleds thickened. At the gates, on both sides, the corpses lay stacked up in piles, and some had already been covered with snow. Some were in hat and coat, and their poses were painfully frozen. Evidently, one man had been walking and sat down in the snow, unable to continue, curled up trying to keep warm, and thus he had died. Some lay only in their underclothes, with their arms cast outward, baring their yellow gums, with an expression of horror in their eyes, in the face of death. Other faces were calm and luminous.

Kocharyan had seen many deaths at the front. Many a time had he grieved over a comrade who had been killed, but never had death at the front awakened in him such painful despair, such obdurate hatred for the enemy, such vehemence and thirst for vengeance.

He did not go to the office to inquire where Catherine Kocharyan was buried. Now this seemed to him ridiculous and almost an insult to those who lay here in their coats and underwear, in shrouds and in rugs. — Are these less deserving of an honorable grave than Katya? He bowed to the dry, frozen corpses and wandered back.

This is the horror the Soviets knew. This is the horror their government does not wish them to forget.

The list of war novelists does not exhaust the roster of women in Soviet literature. There is Seifullina (b. 1889 — ), who was active earlier, in the late twenties, as well as the historical novelist Olga Forsh (b. 1875 — ), who is now in her eighties and gave the opening address at the important Congress of Soviet Writers in 1954. In the presidium of this convention were seen Galina Nikolaeva, Anna Tarasova, as well as Wasilewska and Panova. Novelists Shaginyan and Karavaeva and poets Inber, Aliger



and Bergholts also attended the Congress.

In their writing these Soviet women, like the men, follow the blueprint for authors provided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Stalin statement that the writer is the engineer of the human soul has become the guiding precept of Soviet letters. Now and then, there are deviations. Occasionally, in one way or another, writers manage to say more than is spelled out in the specifications and are promptly chastised.

The most recent cases were those of Vera Panova and Ehrenburg in 1954. In her *Seasons of the Year*, novelist Panova depicted the way in which potentially good and patriotic Soviet people can go astray owing to the hopeless frugality and hardship of life in the U.S.S.R. The author was accused of excessive objectivity which was judged to be at variance with Socialist Realism.

Women are also found in the field of criticism. Dr. Tamara Motyleva, author of *Tolstoi in France* (1947), is what we would call a *comparatiste*, while Z. Kedrina, B. Brainina, and N. Kolchenova as well as many of the creative writers are interpreters of literature from the point of view of Socialist Realism. In history, Pankratova gained some attention recently by her election to the U.S.S.R. Academy of Science. Strictly speaking, she is not a scholar, but a writer of school textbooks. Mention might be made here of the Medievalist at Moscow University, Professor Veksler, the wife of an eminent Soviet physicist.

Summing up the position of Soviet women in letters, we can say that they came into poetry much earlier than into prose, but that currently they are far more effective in the latter. It must be stressed, however, that in this field they are still very heavily outnumbered by men.

Turning to science and technology, we find that here, as in literature, feminine penetration was very slow. In this, the Russian women followed the pattern of their Western counterparts. The nineteenth century produced only one famous woman in Russian science. She was the mathematician Kovalevskaya, who was accorded the signal honor of being elected to the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences.

The turn of the century brought the expansion of the Russian universities and the infiltration of women into the student bodies. Although, as in the United States, the proportion of women students at the time was low, Russian women boldly bid for places in such fields as medicine, engineering, and pharmacy, to say nothing of pedagogy, music, dramatic art, and ballet, in which they had long since established themselves firmly.

Then the bloodshed of World I, the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II steadily lowered the ratio of the whole male population of Russia, while, at the same time, the state and the people strained to protect its domain, to expand its frontiers, to rebuild after the destruction wrought by the various storms, and to raise the standard of living which was lagging pitifully behind that of the rest of the civilized world. Manpower was desperately needed. Women had to be used more and more and in capacities unheard of before. For centuries the Russian peasant women had worked along with the men in the fields, doing heavy work which was sometimes injurious to their health. In the late 1890's women went to work in the new factories. During the war emergencies, they did anything that was needed — from digging trenches, sniping, partisan work, heavy factory and construction labor, bricklaying, riveting, farming, and caring for the ill and wounded, to the lighter jobs of telegraphy, chauffeuring, etc. They had to carry the national economy while the men fought for their country. The official pronouncements of the government and government-approved belles-lettres always reminded the Soviet citizens that the conflict was not merely World War II but the "Great Patriotic War" and the responsibility of every patriotic Russian. When peace came, the Soviet Union kept the women at their tasks; the demobilized men merely increased the ranks of workers in all fields. The strain on women, however, seems to be telling, for recently there has been considerable agitation in the Soviet press to the effect that women must not engage in heavy labor.

Women have assumed an important place in the Soviet scientific world. They are constantly being recruited, trained, and drawn into the intensive scientific program of their country.

They are found in practically every branch of pure and applied science — and in great numbers. From scientific publications and lists of laboratory personnel, one can safely say that there are many more active, practicing women scientists in the Soviet Union than there are in the United States. The ratio of women in this field is much higher than in literature, yet their position is still subservient to that of men — that is, few have attained the same professional stature. Mme Markova, the experimental physicist in high energy particles in the Laboratory of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the atomic physicist V. I. Kalashnikova, the organic chemist Kaverzina, are isolated examples of women's bid for top position in Soviet science. One may note, in passing, that the same is true in the West. Mme Joliot-Curie is the exception rather than the rule.

Generally speaking, one may say that women tend to be meticulous, patient, intelligent workers not prone to those magnificent flights of fancy and genius which open up new horizons, make new discoveries, conceive ingenious inventions. As a rule, with women generally rests the conscientious development and definition of the project envisioned by masculine inspiration. Both roles are necessary, both contribute to progress. Hence it is not surprising to see how often Soviet scientific papers carry a man's name as senior author and then that of a woman collaborator, assistant, or student. The reverse is comparatively rare.

Soviet women are now entering scientific professions which in the United States and the Western world in general are predominantly masculine, — such professions as engineering, agronomy, and medicine. Soviet literature is concentrating its propaganda on getting women into these positions because the nation is shorthanded in its ambitious program of mechanization and industrialization. It is interesting to note, however, that although there is an increasing supply of women engineers, the projects are generally headed up by men.

Agronomy, the science of agriculture, is of prime importance to Russia, where farming is still the backbone of the national economy. Tremendous numbers of agronomists, veterinarians, farm mechanics, etc., are required. Each collective farm has

need of them, and the vast Soviet Union means to have wholesale collectivization of the countryside. Women are invaluable and productive in this work, which they have, after all, engaged in for centuries. Moreover, they afford a steadier personnel than men, who come and go, depending on military and international situations, while farms must continue to be run efficiently in order to feed the country. There is, therefore, a concerted effort to encourage women to assume agricultural leadership and responsibilities and to stay with them regardless of changes in family or other conditions.

The profession in the Soviet Union with the heaviest proportion of women is medicine. Seventy-five per cent of the physicians in the U.S.S.R. are women and current enrollment in Soviet medical schools shows that the three-to-one ratio is going to remain. Compare this with our proportion. In 1954 Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby stated that women constitute only six per cent of the American medical profession and five per cent of the current medical school enrollment, thereby pointing to a future decrease in the number of women doctors in this country. It is true that the Soviet doctor performs many tasks that are handled by nurses in the United States. Nonetheless, the fact remains that in the Soviet Union medicine has become a woman's profession. Yet, even there, *the specialist, the medical genius, is a man.*

During the war, women doctors went into the Soviet armies, swelling the numbers of badly needed medical corps. They worked long hours in field stations, hospital trains, and hospitals. In peace, some of them are not as well fixed as they deserve to be. The Soviet doctors are paid less than the highly skilled workers in the factories, despite their long hours of work, and they encounter other difficulties not faced by our medical profession. Take, for example, the plight of a physician assigned to a factory. Absenteeism in the Soviet factory is a high art, the plague of a factory manager. Workers go to great lengths to get medical excuses from work, with the result that the doctor is caught between the pleas of the workers and the pressure of the system. As one plastic surgeon said, "All day you feel that at

any time any dissatisfied patient may write a letter about you" — and one such letter might end his career. The rural doctors face other difficulties, such as ignorance and superstition on the part of their patients, and a shortage of medicine, instruments, and hospitals. They are often responsible for areas of great geographical extent with poor communications and roads. The Soviet doctor's life is not an easy one.

Despite obvious obstacles, women must be drawn into these activities, and Soviet literature is doing its utmost to propagandize the role of women in society. Expressing the basic tenet of Communist ideology, Soviet belles lettres emphasize that a good member of society must be socially conscious and socially productive. This includes women, as well as men. Furthermore, it propounds the notion, enunciated by the novelist A. Koptyaeva, that "only when a woman actively participates in work of social significance can she become truly attractive, the desired companion of her husband and children, sharing their thoughts, enriching their family life. A woman whose work is in every way equal to that of a man learns to be independent, becomes confident of her ability, develops strength and integrity of character, and this in its turn facilitates the development of her creative prowess." On paper this sounds excellent, but apparently the scheme has many pitfalls. The government is preaching bigger families and is giving prizes to prolific mothers. Yet the question of who is going to bring up the children while this mother is "becoming truly attractive and a desired companion" through productive effort has not really been answered. The institution of the grandmother has been of some help, but it has scarcely solved the problem. The wonders of the kindergarten system of crèche have been exaggerated, with the result that many women with or without professional training prefer to stay home and bring up their families properly — if they can afford it. But then, life in the Soviet Union is so very, very expensive!

In sum, the Soviet woman occupies a very important position in the Soviet world. She is not only expected to be a good wife who keeps her husband toeing the right line, a mother who



brings up her children to become good Communists, and a housekeeper who does wonders in feeding and clothing her growing family on a "shoe-string," but she is urged to be an efficient and interested toiler of the State. As a means to establishing its national and international supremacy, the Soviet government has been building up tremendous manpower in all fields of endeavor. This includes woman-power. While many of our women have chosen to return to their leisure, the U.S.S.R. has kept as many women as possible working in industry, on the farm, in the laboratory, in the army, and in the air. A very heavy propaganda effort is being made to see that she stays there. The reason for this lies partly in the depletion of the male population, partly in the expanding and ambitious programs of the government, and partly in the reliability of female personnel. By keeping women at work, the Soviet regime avoids the necessity of replacing or retraining personnel if an emergency should arise. Soviet women are doing many jobs that are done by men in the United States. Judging by the propaganda in literature, one would suspect that women could carry the whole national agriculture of the U.S.S.R. on their shoulders. This is no doubt, an exaggeration, but there appears to be a substantial element of truth in it. Perhaps it is, in fact, the aim for which the government is working. At the moment, many key positions in Soviet life are held by men, but women stand by as well-indoctrinated and dependable understudies, ready and trained to take over at any time, should men be needed elsewhere.



# A Note on Soviet Science <sup>☆</sup>

BY IVAN D. LONDON

THE view that Soviet science is uniformly patterned after one of its disciplines, genetics, still enjoys a dangerous popularity. Because the story of the degradation of this discipline has been dramatic and well documented, the belief is widespread that in Soviet science, Party control is everywhere stringent and deleterious, prompt practicality of research is *sine qua non*, and dialectical materialism is an incubus on the body scientific. Unfortunately, this is an overly-simple approach to Soviet science. It is time we were reminded that the genetics tragedy in the Soviet Union was in many respects atypical and, accordingly, must be viewed with caution if made to serve as a model for the understanding of Soviet developments in other branches of science. To overlook this is to invite complacency and erroneous deductions concerning the possible scope and pace of future scientific developments in the Soviet Union.

By free use of selected quotations from Soviet sources it is, of course, easy enough to discern an over-all pattern in Soviet science designed after that of the genetics model. But one ought to be somewhat chary about the use of such quotations to get at the actual picture. There is a tendency in both American and émigré scholarship to quote Soviet sources corroboratively when one's notions are thereby bolstered, but to pass them by as untrustworthy, misleading, or inapplicable when the situation is otherwise. But one can't have it both ways. One must learn, in the last analysis, to read between the lines.

The only way out is to proceed to make an analysis in depth, discipline by discipline, until the whole range of the sciences has been covered. This is not a task for one man, but many.

<sup>☆</sup> This paper reflects research undertaken by the Inwood Project on Intercultural Communication under grants from the Inwood Institute and the Dearborn Foundation.

However, even the limited research which has been done in this regard points up a picture of the sciences in the Soviet Union that is quite complex and varied. The result is that most current generalizations on the state of Soviet science are shown to be overly simplified.

For example, it is not difficult to show on the basis of items abstracted from speeches, prefaces, and introductory paragraphs that the whole development of Soviet physiology of the sense organs was prescribed by the Communist Party in order to provide a "concrete basis for Lenin's theory of reflection" and to meet the "demands of practice," industrial, medical, and military, particularly the latter two. Yet a detailed scrutiny of the technical literature, the abbreviated stenographic notes of various meetings and conferences over the years reveals little to suggest that the serious programs of development in the field of sensory physiology were really influenced in any essential way by either practical considerations or Party dicta. Of course, superficially, there may seem to be a planned compliance with the Party line, but any sensory physiologist who is alert to his subject can spot the deliberate dust-in-the-eyes character of some of the research activity undertaken which, whatever its potentialities for future practice, was at the moment nonpractical in nature.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, autonomous considerations have, in the main, suggested the serious programs of research in sensory physiology to be undertaken. Practical considerations in this area were largely incidental and were served with a tongue-in-cheek attitude, for example, by repeating experiments on sense organs, but on sense organs in the pathological state, or by doing them only in a hospital laboratory — and all with the tritely pious hope that variations of reactions from the normal may yield a diagnostic index of the pathological condition. Protection from accusations of aloof detachment from the world of "socialist practice" could also be furthered by prudent placement of articles, summarizing research, in journals whose publication policy was heavy

<sup>1</sup>I. London. "Research on Sensory Interaction in the Soviet Union." *Psychological Bulletin*, 1954, vol. 51, pp. 531-568.

on practice and light on theory. Evidently there are many devices which a resourceful Soviet scientist can utilize to mask independent research.

On the other hand, other areas of physiology have exhibited a position half-way, as it were, between the laissez-faire of sensory physiology and the blight within genetics. Thus, Anokhin and Orbeli, physiologists of world-wide reputation, were accused in 1950 of deviating from the "consistently materialist theory of Academician I. P. Pavlov," and were publicly disgraced and removed from positions of influence. But they were not physically destroyed, exiled, or removed from centers of research. Their programs of research were, of course, held to the rigid confines of a dogmatic Pavlovism; but even within these harsh bounds, latitude may be sensed. Furthermore, the ignorant and aggressive charlatanism of Lysenko is not matched in Bykov and Ivanov-Smolensky, the vigilant exponents of official pressure against deviationism in physiology and related disciplines.

The genetics model is thus seen as only partially applicable in many areas of physiological research, whereas in sensory physiology it was until recently, wholly inapplicable for an understanding of developments in that particular field.

The much-cited stress on immediate practicality in Soviet programs of research is doubtful. What do we find in any number of scientific fields in the Soviet Union? Research on cosmic rays, for example, is remote from practice; yet Soviet physicists are leaders in this field; topology is an abstruse branch of mathematics which begs for direct application to practice, yet Soviet topologists are among the élite of the mathematical world; the theory of probability, distantly related to practice, is highly cultivated, although Lysenko scorned statistics.

As regards the matter of conformity in scientific theory and practice to dialectical materialism, the situation is similarly complex. What, for example, is the relevance of the latter to the concepts of modern physics, so much of which cannot readily be comprehended in terms of classical idealism or materialism? Yet quantum physics is highly developed in the Soviet

Union. Blokhintsev, in his text on quantum mechanics, speaks openly and unapologetically of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, although the journal, *Problems of Philosophy*, has been packed with commandeered articles attacking indeterminacy as contrary to science and materialism. What if this journal does enunciate its hostility to Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy? One can build A- and H-bombs with the aid of Blokhintsev's book, but what about the unsophisticated rubbish in *Problems of Philosophy*? The Soviet leadership knows, that, regardless of ideological contradiction and embarrassment, practice demonstrates that Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, which is censured for the lay intellectual public, is nevertheless a necessary operating principle for the physicists who are charged with producing results. In this instance, a hands-off-the-physicists attitude is, while not publicly prescribed, practiced. Where practice and ideology contend in Soviet science, the latter eventually gives way. Ideology can be manipulated but not practice; a thermonuclear weapon either explodes or it doesn't!

Until recently cybernetics and symbolic logic have been assiduously condemned in the same journal, *Problems of Philosophy*, for their idealistic essence. Yet suddenly the world hears of the operation of an electronic computer in the Soviet Union, although you can't build such a computing machine without cybernetics and symbolic logic. These studies must have been strenuously pursued by topflight mathematicians and engineers at the very time that these two subjects were under public attack, if only in order to keep track of the research being reported thereon in foreign technical literature. Thus, we find once more the danger of relying on the Party line as a clue to what is really going on in many fields of Soviet science.

A few words should be said about the status of the individual scientist in the Soviet Union. The current fashion is to view him as the helpless pawn in a system of stifling controls. This is Marxism without the economism of Marx. The essential fact of man is not that he is quiescent and malleable, but that he strives and seeks fulfillment on ever higher levels. No matter how de-

testable the political system might be, no man wants to live a wasted life and this is especially true of the intellectual. He will aspire and try to attain his ends in spite of all constraints. He can, for example, choose with reasonable freedom his own field of endeavor. In the Soviet Union this has resulted in the migration of the best scientifically inclined minds into the physical and mathematical sciences, leaving many of the non-physical sciences stripped of first-rate recruits. Thus the weaknesses, manifest in the Soviet non-physical sciences, are not necessarily due to the dead hand of Party control; the reason may lie simply in the poverty of human material which goes to make up the composition of their cadres.

Finally, one must remark on the disparity between real Soviet accomplishment in the sciences and Western analyses, which, while true enough as far as they go, make such accomplishment incomprehensible. An American officer who survived the last war in the Pacific once read an unflattering exposé of the American military command in *The Naked and the Dead*. He asked, "If that book is a picture of the American Army, why did we win the war?" We may ask the question, "If Soviet science reflects the genetics model, how can it now constitute a threat to the free world?" In whatever light we view the problem, urgent research and re-thinking are indicated.

# Russian Symbolists: The Mirror Theme and Allied Motifs

BY OLEG A. MASLENIKOV

FOR a century and a half the mirror image has especially excited the imagination of creative writers, from the German Romantics to the French Symbolists and their contemporaries in other lands, including Russia.

In numerous poems and in several works of Andrey Bely (1880-1934) the reflected image plays an important role. As with other writers, in Bely's case the reflection portends a tragic (or an ironically tragicomic) end for his characters who, in true Symbolist tradition, must be associated with the writer himself.

The novel *Petersburg* (1911) may well serve as the starting point for the present analysis. The narrative abounds in references to mirrors as it fairly radiates an atmosphere of "gloss, lacquer, and glitter." One recalls such scenes as those depicting the small, chicken-like Senator Ableukhov as he stands appraising himself in one of the many mirrors of his home, or the scene portraying the senator's son (and would-be assassin) Nikolay Apolonovich Ableukhov as he pauses involuntarily before a mirror to gaze Narcissus-like upon his masked figure, robed in red.<sup>1</sup>

In his later memoirs<sup>2</sup> Bely confessed that in the fall of 1906, during his famous quarrel with Blok, while expecting almost momentarily a challenge to a duel with his rival, he spent hours in his apartment, alone, disguised from the world and even from himself by a black mask and a red robe. True to the Symbolist concept of fusing art with one's life, Bely, through the character

<sup>1</sup>A. Bely, *Peterburg*, 1916, Ch. III, pt. II, p. 7, and pt. I, pp. 57-58.

<sup>2</sup>A. Bely, *Mezhdru dvukh revoliutsii*, Leningrad, 1934, pp. 89-92.



of young Ableukhov, relives certain phases of his personal drama. The creator, as well as his creation, seems to await an inexorable Fate to transform him into an unwilling murderer: Bely — of his "spiritual brother" and rival Ableukhov — of his father. Each, like Lermontov's Pechorin, expects to play the "executioner, designated by Fate." That such a concept of himself, as a submissive tool of destiny, may have appealed to Bely may be seen from an earlier poem ("Vozvrat," 1903) in which he confesses readiness to yield to his cosmic Fate.

Such an attitude could explain Bely's robing himself and his double in an executioner's mask and scarlet gown. Then he could view the resultant image in the mirror with admiration, envy, and pride, mingled with revulsion and horror, and yet feel free to say — "This is not I; it is Destiny's executioner." Whatever the actual motives were, the mirrored image portended a ruined life both for Bely and for his reflection, Ableukhov.

In *The Second Symphony* (1901), a nameless Philosopher (i.e., a superior individual, a man of advanced intellect and sensibility), who is in part again a dissembling self-caricature of Bely, grows abnormally conscious of the reflections in the enormous mirror that hangs in his room, and which continuously presents to him "the self-same views." But is this image actually one of the seeming material reality, or does the mirror reflect something more than meets the naked eye? And does its reflection remain forever constant? Whenever a visitor calls, the Philosopher realizes that his looking-glass shows not the visitor, but "another person [who chances to be] identical with his caller." Haunted by this dual image of reality, the philosopher soon nears insanity. One night as he walks home he imagines that somewhere in the nocturnal chaos lurks a nameless horror, stalking him, ready to pounce on its prey. And just at that moment he recalls

"the huge mirror that hangs in his solitary apartment  
and that the mirror even now reflects his room."

Then, being a scholar, a follower of Kant, a man versed in "critical thinking," he begins worrying whether the looking glass reflects his room correctly. And as the Philosopher loses his

mind he is taken to an insane asylum.

The mirrored image plays its most important role, however, in Bely's *Third Symphony; The Return* (1904). Ostensibly *The Return* records a clinical case history of insanity. Yet, as a matter of fact, it argues for the Nietzschean idea of the "eternal return,"<sup>3</sup> as it argues for the concept of plurality of existence as opposed to the interpretation of the world as established by scientific reasoning; and in so doing, it seeks to substitute for it the vision of "the real world" as imagined by a madman. To achieve this end Bely again resorts to the mirror image.

The *Symphony's* first movement records the action on a distant island, where we first meet the hero in the guise of a typically Nietzschean fair-haired, blue-eyed superchild, playing on the shore of a mirror-like cove. In the second movement the scene abruptly changes to twentieth century Moscow, and as the story progresses the reader is made to realize that the child is actually Evgeny Handrikov, a budding scientist, a candidate for a higher degree in chemistry, who in fits of aberration escapes into his dream world, in which he sees himself as the child. Bely carefully builds up a convincing parallelism between the characters in Handrikov's dream world and their prototypes in "actual" life.

Although a scientist, Handrikov (like the Philosopher) realizes that his existence is not limited to our phenomenal world; and as the reader follows him into a barber shop, he sees Handrikov staring into the double mirrors that reflect him innumerable times in his various existences.

The reader soon learns that Handrikov's psychosis is getting steadily worse. The climax of his struggle with insanity comes at a banquet in celebration of Handrikov's completing his work for the higher degree. Here, Tsenkh proposes a toast for the continued development of culture which, according to him, is closely dependent on scientific progress of this materialistic science. Thereupon, Handrikov leaps up to refute this point of view. As Bely has Handrikov attack the accepted, positivistic concept of reality, he resorts to the mirror image in discussing

<sup>3</sup>A. Bely, *Arabeski*, Moscow, 1911, *passim*, and especially pp. 83, 89, 232.

the meaning of what is real, and of the relative merits of arts and science:

If art is a copy of life, it is superfluous in the presence of the original. . . . If, however, life exists for the sake of art, it exists for the sake of the reflection that meets me each time that I approach the mirror . . . And yet, I don't know — perhaps those who say that life exists for art are right, because we may turn out to be not people, but only their reflections. And it is not we who approach a mirror; but it is the reflection of someone unknown who approaches me from the other side and increases in size on the mirror's surface. So that actually, we neither go anywhere, nor come from anywhere, but merely expand and contract on the surface, all the while remaining on the same plane.

Finally, Handrikov's physician, the psychiatrist, Dr. Orlov, takes him to the refuge of his sanatorium.

Here the dénouement takes place.

Dr. Orlov takes Handrikov boating with him on the giant mirror that is the lake.

It seemed to Handrikov that they were floating on a sea of ether between two skies. Shores had encircled the aerial blue span that looked like a lake. But it was no lake — it was a mirror that reflected the sky. It was the sky itself into which he and the boat had overturned.

Ultimately, the psychiatrist is obliged to go abroad, and the end becomes as inevitable as in a Greek tragedy. The reader suspects that the doctor may even have planned the outcome.

Handrikov goes out alone on the lake. There he hears someone singing "Come to me . . . come to me . . ." It is one of the inmates singing a popular air from the shore. But to Handrikov, drifting between the two skies, the call seems to come from *below*, from the reflection that accompanies him. And Handrikov reaches a decision . . . to join his double.

"I'm coming . . ." An instant . . . and rippling, the emerald green water swept into the foundering boat and glistened with melted rubies. Handrikov threw up his arms and plunged into the chasm of emerald green. The reflection springs at him in an attempt to defend its borders against his invasion.

Handrikov melted into its embraces.

An osprey circling above cried . . . as it laughed at the impossible.

The reader, who is made to realize that Handrikov's dream

world is only an insane man's reflection of our real world, is startled to find Handrikov in the epilogue as the child again on his happy isle, in the dream world that supposedly existed only in the mind of a man bereft of reason.

While the Philosopher underwent only the first step of the mirror transformation — all he attained was insanity — Handrikov, after suffering the cathartic pains of madness attained his final reward — the old man's promise never again to be forced to leave his happy surroundings and never again to be subjected to the humiliation of another futile human existence on earth.

Bely's mirrored images have interesting parallels in Russian Symbolist literature. Both mirror and reflection figure prominently in the works of Bely's modernist colleagues, and both are frequently found connected with the themes of superman, insanity, and doom.

Konstantin Balmont in his poem "The Old House"<sup>4</sup> depicts "friends and enemies emerging from the mirror depths that come alive at midnight." And in a longer poem, "The Devil-Artist"<sup>5</sup> and in "The Obsession," the devil's visage appears to the poet from between "two facing mirrors."

One may mention also a scene in Sologub's trilogy *The Created Legend* (1908-1912) in which one of the characters glances into the magic mirror of the wizard, poet, and superman, Trirodov, and involuntarily shrieks with horror at the terrifying reflection that greets her.<sup>6</sup> The mirror reveals to her a truth concealed from her in "real life." In this respect Trirodov's looking-glass unmistakably reminds one of the mirrors of the Philosopher and of Handrikov.

More direct, however, is the connection between Bely's mirror sequences and a short story by Valery Briusov, "In the Looking Glass."<sup>7</sup> Briusov's nameless heroine, like Handrikov and like

<sup>4</sup>K. Balmont, *Tolko liubov*, in *Polnoe sobranie stikhotvorenii*, Moscow, 1913, Vol. IV, pp. 99-100.

<sup>5</sup>K. Balmont, *Budem, kak solntse*, Moscow, 1903, pp. 252-253.

<sup>6</sup>F. Sologub, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. XVIII, pp. 28-29.

<sup>7</sup>V. Briusov, *Zemnaja os*, Moscow, 1910, pp. 13-23.

the Philosopher, is mentally unstable and, like the two characters in Bely, becomes obsessed with the notion that the mirror depths conceal "special worlds," each one of which is endowed with a unique, tangible existence of its own. She imagines that she is forced to exchange places with her mirrored reflection and eventually succeeds in escaping from the mirror only by luring her double back into the looking-glass. She then loses her mind. Like Bely's two characters she is unable to determine for herself which is the actual world.

It is of interest to note that Briusov wrote his short story (dated 1902-1906) after he had become acquainted with Bely's Second Symphony in the editorial offices of the Scorpio Publishing House, where it had been submitted for publication in 1901. Thus, in this case at any rate, the traditionally accepted view of teacher and pupil between Briusov and Bely seems reversed, with Bely appearing as the fountainhead and Briusov as the receptive disciple.

The mirror theme of Bely, however, finds its most striking parallels in Zinaida Hippus' collection of short stories *Mirrors* (1898), one of which, "The Witch" (1896),<sup>8</sup> undoubtedly influenced the climactic scene of *The Return*.

Hippus' heroine, Marfusha, perishes because she longs to taste of the superhuman and yearns to rise above the commonplace. She is a domestic who aspires to experience the supernatural. Her yearning takes the shape of an irrepressible urge to fly, which to her naive, superstitious mind means to soar witchlike above the earth. In this Marfusha resembles Sologub's seemingly angelic Queen Ortruda (*The Created Legend*), who also confesses a suppressed desire to join the witches in their revels. Like Ortruda and like Handrikov, Marfusha longs to prove to herself that the inexplicable still exists and is possible. She believes that her opportunity has arrived when she inherits the only treasure of the dying French governess, who, in the eyes of Marfusha and of the other servants, is unquestionably a witch.

Contemplating her new gown, Marfusha is thrilled to think

<sup>8</sup>Hippus, *Zerkala*, St. Petersburg, 1898, pp. 83-130.



that she, too, at last possesses the power to fly. One night she finds herself unable any longer to suppress the urge to test her gown. She puts it on and secretly goes to the lake, where one night the servants spying on the old Frenchwoman had overheard her mumbling to herself unintelligible words that could have been only magic incantations.

Above the still lake, motionless as glass, the moon again was shining. The water seemed to have absorbed all sound, for all around stood a measureless silence. The slough, the willow, and the high shore were lighted evenly and brightly . . . Marfusha drew closer. Two sturdy branches of the old willow stretched above the water, high above it. Hoping to catch sight of the pale hand of a mermaid, Marfusha felt an urge to steal a glance into the water. She climbed along one of the branches until she sat directly above the water . . . There in the slough reposed the same blue-black heights as overhead: with the same moon, yellow and crystalline. The water was so motionless that at times it appeared — not to exist. A peculiar exhilaration filled her, because she no longer felt the rich black soil beneath her feet. . . . Looking down . . . she saw the yellow moon. She bent lower and gazed intently into the waters. . . . A rapture that she had not known before now filled the girl: it was the joy of release. She closed her eyes and plunged. It seemed to her that she was falling into the sky . . .

And, like Handrikov, Marfusha perishes when she tries to reach her reflection in the mirror of the lake.

These incidents taken from Russian Symbolist writings find many a parallel in Western literature and undoubtedly owe a debt to several foreign sources. As treated by the Western writers, especially the Romantics and the Modernists, the reflection becomes endowed with some mysterious power, frequently possessing magic significance.<sup>9</sup> Time and again the looking-glass and the mirroring waters are portrayed as reflecting not the outward reality, but an inner truth. Often the contemplation of this truth brings sorrow in its wake. Passing over Mallarmé's "Héro-

<sup>9</sup>For examples of mirror magic see Goethe's *Faust*; E. T. A. Hoffman's "Abenteuer der Sylvester-Nacht" and its forerunner, Chamisso's "Peter Schlemihl"; Zhukovsky's "Svetlana." More recently: Hans Christian Andersen's "The Little Sea Maid"; Bram Stoker's thriller *Dracula*; Tennyson's "The Lady of Shalott"; Oscar Wilde's "Fisherman and His Soul"; Hugo von Hofmannsthal's *Frau ohne Schatten*; Franz Werfel's *Spiegelmensch*, and *Der Abenturiententag*.



diade," the imprint of which is clear on Briusov's story, though certainly not on Bely's *Philosopher*, one may call to mind a series of mirror incidents beginning with Chamisso's *Peter Schlemihl* and Hoffmann's *Adventure of Sylvester Eve*, and the fairy tales published from the times of the brothers Grimm through Anderson and Wilde and down to the writings of Valéry, Gide, and Werfel.<sup>10</sup> The reflection seems mysteriously connected with tribulations and even tragedy. And most of these stories convey the impression that mirrors have the magic power to reflect a man's soul, rather than just his outward appearance.

Some scholars see all these scenes stemming from the Greek tale of Narcissus, the young god who, according to Ovid's *Metamorphoses* fell in love with his own reflection, rejected the love of the nymph Echo, and died of an unrequited love for himself. According to another account, however, Narcissus was in love with his twin sister, who died; and he liked to regard as hers, the reflection that he saw in the water and for whom he pined away.

Research devoted to the mirror image testifies that to the primitive mind the mirrored reflection, together with the shadow, the portrait, and even the echo, are synonymous with the soul.<sup>11</sup>

One also learns that the superstitions ascribing magic powers to mirrors are widespread among all peoples. To an unsophisticated mind, mirrors seem able to reflect the hidden, mysterious life and power of a being. Small wonder, then, that the mirror symbol should appeal to individuals who, like the Romantics and their successors, wished to refute the outlook of a complex mechanized civilization and to return to the simpler naive beliefs of "natural" man.

One may observe coincidentally that Hindu philosophy, (which, significantly, gained a considerable following in Europe and America during the past century, i.e., since Helen Blavatsky

<sup>10</sup>For Gide, see Enid Starkie, *André Gide*, 1953; and of course, Otto Rank's "Der Doppelgänger."

<sup>11</sup>See Géza Róheim, *Spiegelzauber*, 1919.

began to popularize Theosophy), is also fond of mirror analogies, especially when it discusses the connection between the soul, the self, and the unconscious.<sup>12</sup> Consequently one is not surprised to find that the mirror plays an important role in the iconography of the Orient, in its religious rites, and in its mythology.<sup>13</sup>

Could not, therefore, this preoccupation of the symbolist writers with the mirror reflection be connected with an urge to turn back their mode of thinking and thus be permitted to reclaim their souls which nineteenth-century science seemed to destroy? Are not the "medieval" and the "neoprimitive" trends of romanticism and of modernism (Nietzsche, Maeterlinck, Cabell, Ivanov, for example) just another facet of this striving? Would not a similar absorption with the non-materialistic yet sophisticated philosophy of the Orient reflect a similar urge? (Yeats, Balmont, Bely are merely a few Symbolist poets who were interested in Theosophy.)

Would such a yearning for the inexplicable not seek to refute the logic, the reasoning power of science, and would it not reflect the human spirit's thirst for mystery, of which Dostoevsky spoke in his *Legend of the Grand Inquisitor*?

Would not, therefore, this desire to reject the Reason (*der Sinn*) of our civilization lead to espousing unreason, to embracing the irrational, and ultimately to proclaiming Aberration (*der Unsinn*) — un-Reason — as the manifest destiny of Humanity?

The affirmative answers to these questions are seen in the anti-rationalism of the Russian Symbolists, many of whom regarded Nietzsche with reverence and extolled poets as near-supermen, capable in their art of creating new worlds (and

<sup>12</sup>See J. Hastings, (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, especially the article "Mirror," vol. VIII, pp. 695-697.

<sup>13</sup>See quotations given by James Hastings from texts published in the *Sacred Books of the Orient* series. Further material can be found in various works on Oriental philosophy and religion. Suzuki, in his *Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra*, London, 1930, has a number of references to mirror images, similarly S. Dasgupta in his four-volume *History of Oriental Philosophy*, 1940, is especially fond of referring to the mirror when he discusses the concept of the soul.

thus surpassing the men of science). They believed that in moments of poetic ecstasy and frenzy the poets were capable of piercing the veil that separates the "real" world from ours, its poor shadow. To them art was mightier than science and, following Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, they thought that the man of the future would be a superman, an artist, a visionary, and a wizard, who could combine intuitive perception with rational thinking.

To them the terms "madness" and "genius" were nearly synonymous, and poetic agitation, not scientific calculation, was the objective to be sought. The positivist would shrug away these views as unworthy of comment. And yet, even some "men of science" found the formula: "genius=madman=superman," acceptable.

In 1913, undoubtedly under the influence of the Italian psychiatrist, Cesare Lombroso, several of whose works were known in Russia, Dr. Nikolay Vavulin, a psychiatrist, published a monograph, *Insanity, Its Meaning and Value*, in which he equates the artist with the madman and superman: "The inexpressibly pleasant, feverish condition during artistic creation resembles the maniacal excitement of the madman. The disturbed equilibrium of geniuses is like that of the insane." Following Nietzsche, he continues: "The psychic organization of geniuses, just as of madmen, bridges the gap between lower and higher mankind." Vavulin concludes his monograph: "I regard insanity of the higher order [schizophrenia and paranoia — and how many heroes of our imaginative literature would qualify under this category!] as the trial through which mankind must pass on its way to the new kingdom of light and happiness. The mark of the coming man — is sanity of the higher order."<sup>14</sup> Thus Vavulin seems to paraphrase the theme of Bely's *Third Symphony*, that the "superior" human must suffer through insanity before he can attain supermanhood.

Precisely in the works of Bely we see the budding higher man searching for his soul, an irrational concept in itself. And

<sup>14</sup>N. Vavulin, *Bezumie, ego smysl i tsennost*, St. Petersburg, 1913, pp. 136, 138 and 230-231.

for him the mirror (or the lake) by its age-old association with the reflection of the soul becomes the instrument by means of which he can attain his quest.

In searching for his soul, Handrikov suffers insanity and eventually perishes, yet he crosses the chasm that separates the materialistic, rational civilization of man and the idealistic, intuitive world of the superman.

Thus the mirror is the symbol of man's rejection of materialistic reason in his search to repossess his lost soul. The mirror is also the instrument by means of which he achieves insanity and thereby — supermanhood.

# *The Chekhov Publishing House*

BY MICHAEL KARPOVICH

THE first books of the Chekhov Publishing House, established by the East European Fund with the help of a grant from the Ford Foundation, appeared in the spring of 1952. It discontinued its activity in April, 1956. By that time, its list of publications included over one hundred and fifty titles. It seems appropriate to attempt a general appraisal of this unique and significant venture.

This Russian-language publishing house on American soil was not meant to serve as just another instrument of the "cold war" — a mere vehicle of anti-Communist propaganda. The idea was to assist Russian émigrés, more particularly the postwar Soviet émigrés, in satisfying their spiritual needs and in finding their bearings in the western world. A closely allied purpose was to provide a medium of experience for creative writers from among the émigrés, old and new alike. In accordance with these broadly conceived aims, the publication program of the Chekhov Publishing House included a great variety of subjects, some of them far removed from the burning political issues of the present moment.

This, I believe, was a wise decision. One of the main theoretical tenets and practical props of every totalitarian regime, and of the Soviet regime in particular, is the submission of all intellectual life to a rigid governmental control, an uncompromising denial of the autonomy of culture and an attempt to force literature to become a handmaid of politics. Therefore, free creative activity on the part of Russian émigrés assumes the nature of a direct challenge to the Soviet system of thought control and, in the long range, might become a powerful weapon in the ideological struggle against Communism.

If the Chekhov Publishing House did not try to pursue any immediate political objectives, it does not mean, of course, that

it tried to avoid the present-day Russian reality. On the contrary, and quite naturally so, it assigned a considerable space to the treatment of the contemporary Russian scene. Apart from some scholarly works on such subjects as Soviet national economy and anti-semitism in the Soviet Union, this category of books consists mostly of personal records written by the post-war émigrés. Some of them relate the gruesome details of life in Soviet prisons and concentration camps or the equally tragic story of the siege of Leningrad, while others write of their experiences on the "road to freedom." Still others deal with such miscellaneous topics as the Soviet army, the ways of Soviet bureaucracy, the everyday life of Soviet actors and musicians. In various degrees, these personal records contain valuable information, and all of them are important human documents which enable us to get a better insight into the various phases of Soviet life.

Those of the émigrés who grew up under the Soviet regime as a rule know very little of Russia's pre-revolutionary past, and whatever they know has come to them in a distorted fashion. One of the tasks of the Chekhov Publishing House was to bring them closer to Russian cultural tradition. General surveys of Russian history as well as books on the history of Russian thought, art, and literature were published with this purpose in view. It was served also by such works as biographies of great Russian writers, selected writings of outstanding Russian thinkers, and some volumes of literary criticism.

One might include in the same category memoirs of those of the older émigrés who played an active, and in some cases even a leading, part in the cultural and political life of pre-revolutionary Russia. Here again one finds a great variety of both authors and subjects. With laudable impartiality, the Chekhov Publishing House included in its list of memoir-writers a Grand Duke, a general of the imperial army, and the daughter of a tsarist premier, side by side with opposition leaders who had been waging a struggle against the old regime. The political views of the memoirists range from conservatism through liber-



alism to socialism (of the non-Bolshevik variety, to be sure). Many sides of pre-revolutionary Russian life are reflected in these recollections as well as many fields of activity: art, literature, journalism, education, army, government, politics, and business. The general picture that emerges is one of great diversity, which must be a revelation to many of the Soviet-trained readers. Nor can they fail to be impressed by the evidence of the fairly wide margin of liberty that was won by the Russian people before 1917.

Even more than Russia's past, Western life and thought remained largely unknown to those of the émigrés who had been brought up behind the Iron Curtain. Two categories of books were designed to fill this gap in the Soviet émigrés' intellectual equipment. Works of more general nature have dealt with such topics as the growth of political theory, the meaning of freedom, the "crisis of industrial civilization," and the "revolt of the masses." A larger number of books, however, have been published with the more specific aim of acquainting the newcomers to this country with American life, history, and culture. Except for a concise manual of American government, this series consists of various translated works of American authors. Some of these books deal with history (James Truslow Adams' *The Epic of America* and Herbert Agar's *Abraham Lincoln*), others with the contemporary scene (Frederick Lewis Allen's *The Big Change*, John Gunther's *Inside U.S.A.* and George F. Kennan's *The Realities of American Foreign Policy*). Of the experience of earlier emigrants to America, the Russian émigré readers can learn from Oscar Handlin's *The Uprooted*, *The Americanization of Edward Bok*, and Michael Pupin's *From Immigrant to Inventor*. Modern American literature is represented by the works of Willa Cather, Stephen Crane, Honoré Wilsie Morrow, Elizabeth Page, Conrad Richter, William Saroyan, and Thornton Wilder. Somewhat apart must be put the Chekhov Publishing House's most ambitious undertaking — the unabridged translation of Winston Churchill's *The Second World War*. Of this work only the first three volumes (each published in two parts) appeared,

and the project seems to be destined to remain incomplete.

A very prominent place in the publication program of the Chekhov Publishing House was occupied by fiction and poetry. The cultural importance of this side of its activity is fairly obvious. Separated from their native soil and not always able to reach a sufficiently wide audience, émigré writers have found themselves in a singularly difficult position in every country and at all times. In the unsettled conditions of our age, however, their difficulties have become particularly acute. The valiant efforts of the Russian émigré writers to overcome the obstacles in their way received a heartening support from the Chekhov Publishing House. It published a number of works of such outstanding Russian writers as Bunin, Merezhkovsky, Remizov, Zaitzev, Aldanov, and Nabokov as well as those of their younger and somewhat less known contemporaries. It also made a special effort to encourage creative activity of still younger writers belonging to the postwar Soviet emigration, among whom some new talent has been discovered (as, for instance, the poet Ivan Elagin and the novelist Sergei Maximov).

In the field of belles-lettres, another significant feature of the Chekhov Publishing House program should be mentioned. It undertook to rescue from oblivion those works of Soviet writers which either were virtually withdrawn from circulation after their authors had been found guilty of a political deviation or else were not permitted to appear in print at all. Thus, among the first books it published were an anthology of Anna Akhmatova's poetry and a volume of Zoshchenko's short stories. These, two, it will be remembered, were the earliest victims of Zhdanov's notorious literary purge. Among the other reprints of a similar nature are the writings of Bulgakov, Romanov, and the Ilf and Petrov team. Some of these were openly forbidden in the Soviet Union, others, virtually made inaccessible to the average Soviet reader. The Chekhov Publishing House continued this work of "literary resurrection" by publishing two anthologies of short stories and novels — one, by the members of the "*Pere-*

val" group<sup>1</sup>, and the other, by various hands (the last one under the expressive title *Proscribed Tales*).

Some of the publications in this category can be considered truly important events in Russian literary history. The late Eugene Zamyatin's *We*, written in 1921, could not be published in Soviet Russia. A striking anticipation both of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and George Orwell's *1984*, it is a tragically satirical picture of a fully realized Communist society. In the period before the Second World War, several translations of the novel were published in Western countries, and an abbreviated Russian version appeared in an émigré journal, but it was in the Chekhov Publishing House edition that the full original text first became available. Of equal literary importance has been the publication of the first complete (or nearly complete) editions of the works of Nikolai Kluyev and Osip Mandelshtam. Kluyev belongs to the so-called "peasant group" of Russian poets and is one of its most promising representatives. Mandelshtam is undoubtedly one of the foremost modern Russian poets. Both were persecuted by the Soviet regime and both died in exile.

A brief mention should be made also of a few reprints of those works of pre-revolutionary fiction which, on the grounds of "ideological incompatibility," have not been, and are not likely to be, reprinted in the Soviet Union.

I hope that this summary review of the activities of the Chekhov Publishing House will give the reader a sufficiently clear idea of their scope and nature. Certainly, not everything it did is immune to criticism. Not all of its publications have been on an equally high level of importance and literary distinction. It might be argued that some of the books that were published could be easily dispensed with and that more valuable works could have been published in their place. But then, can one find

<sup>1</sup>"*Pereval*" (The Crest) was a voluntary association of young Soviet writers formed in Moscow in 1924. It was abolished by a decree of the Soviet government, together with all other such associations, in 1934. While accepting the Revolution and professing political loyalty to the regime it insisted on the recognition of the writer's autonomy in the performance of his literary work.

any publishing house, no matter how well-established and respectable, that could boast of a uniformly successful record of performance?

On the whole, it has been an impressive achievement. To a large degree, the Chekhov Publishing House effectively served those purposes for which it was founded. It has provided a large amount of reading material which has enabled the postwar Soviet émigrés to acquire a better knowledge and a more correct understanding both of their own national past and of the Western civilization. It has given the creative writers of the emigration a wider opportunity for self-expression, and it has encouraged new talent among the younger émigré generation. It has published a number of books of permanent value which are bound to become an integral part of Russian literary and historical record, and eventually to find their way to the native country of their authors. And finally, by its very existence and more directly by some parts of its publication program, it has been an eloquent and telling challenge to the suppression of free thought and free literature by the Communist dictatorship.

The discontinuation of the activities of the Chekhov Publishing House leaves a void that will be keenly felt by the Russian emigration. Nor would it be easy for it to fill this void by its own efforts. We know enough about the mounting difficulties which book-publishing meets on its way, even in this rich and abounding country, to fail to understand the émigrés' predicament in this matter. Moreover, the loss is not one of the émigrés' alone. This is one of the fields in which the community of interests between the American democracy and the anti-Communist Russian emigration seems to be indisputable.

## Book Reviews

KENNAN, GEORGE F. *Russia Leaves the War*. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1956. 544 pp. \$7.00.

Mr. Kennan's general interpretation of the Russian Revolution and of its impact upon world affairs is familiar to us from a number of short papers and lectures. He has now decided to examine in detail one aspect of the general problem, namely, the international setting of the first years of the Soviet regime as revealed particularly in its relations with the United States. The present volume is the first of a study of Soviet-American relations between 1917 and 1920. It covers the period between the November revolution and the ratification of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk.

Some may argue that the length of the book is disproportionate to the subject matter, but this would be a mistake. It is, indeed, difficult to see how the account of problems that interest Mr. Kennan could be dealt with on a lesser scale. For, as a professional diplomat turned historian, he is well aware of the contingent nature of political decisions. While it is true that these decisions were ultimately governed by vast and, as it were, impersonal factors — for Mr. Kennan does not subscribe to those beliefs which hold that the attitude of the Bolsheviks would have been very different had they met with a more ready welcome from the capitalist powers which they have sworn to destroy

— he knows that the actual day-to-day decisions that have to be made are made by individuals in the light of their own information and their own personal habits of mind. In this particular case, the United States policy was affected both by the often discordant views and actions of the interesting but highly heterogeneous group of Americans, ranging from Ambassador Francis to his negro butler, who happened to have found themselves in the Russian capital in the critical weeks, and by the curious relations that existed between President Wilson, his Secretary of State, and Colonel House. There were different sources of information and there were different centers of authority at home; and public opinion, necessarily ill-informed and misled by its own government as to the significance and nature of the crisis Russia was passing through in 1917, was in no position to give guidance. By a fortunate chance, nearly all the people involved on the American side had one thing in common — the duty or the desire to put things on paper. This means that the materials for such a study are exceptionally rich, although this does not detract from the debt one owes Mr. Kennan for his efforts in pursuit of them. Because relations between these personalities on the American side — Francis, William Boyce Thompson, Raymond Robins, Edgar Sisson, Wilson, Lansing, House and others — were so poorly

co-ordinated and because what was actually going on in the Bolshevik camp was unknown in its entirety to any of them, Mr. Kennan is in a position not merely to recreate the problems as they were seen at the time, but to give a picture of the whole situation which no one on either side could then have possessed. For the historian of international relations, whatever the particular field of his interest, this is a work of the greatest possible interest.

Because of his devotion to seeing things as they actually impinged upon the persons he is dealing with, of whom Colonel Robins is perhaps the most interesting one, Mr. Kennan gives an admirable series of character sketches, although some of the accounts are necessarily taken up with relatively minor affairs arising out of the mutual suspicions between the Americans. So far as the affair of the "Sisson papers" is concerned, Mr. Kennan has been content to state here his conclusions that these were forgeries and to allow his demonstration to be printed separately in the *Journal of Modern History*. It may be remarked that his book went to press before he could take advantage of the documents illustrating the German assistance to the Bolsheviks collected and published by Dr. G. Katkov in *International Affairs* for April, 1956.

When these minor matters are removed one central theme presents itself, even though it is normally broken up under the headings "Recognition," "Intervention," and so on. Before the Bolsheviks seized power the American government labored under the illusion that Russia could be kept in the

war by appealing to idealistic motives and reframing Allied war aims to accord with them. Afterwards, Americans tended vastly to overestimate the importance to the Russian masses, and in the immediate context, to the Bolsheviks themselves, the international aspect of the Revolution. Attempts to find common ground in resistance to German imperialist expansion necessarily broke down because of this wide gulf of mutual incomprehension. Various Americans, notably the military attaché Judson and, to the very end, Robins himself, tried to bridge this gulf by exploring ways in which the Bolsheviks might be induced by offers of American aid to continue the struggle. Mr. Kennan suggests that when Trotsky went back to Brest-Litovsk early in January, 1918, for the second stage of the peace talks, he did so under a mistaken impression that American policy was far more ready to assist the Soviet government than was in fact the case. Again, in a discussion with Trotsky on March 5, Robins took Trotsky as having gone far beyond what he had intended to say and derived the impression once more that the question of Western aid would be decisive for the acceptance or non-acceptance of the peace terms. Mr. Kennan's book finally makes it clear that the Soviet decision was from the beginning certain to be in favor of peace if the Germans made it at all possible, and that all contacts with the Allies were no more than insurances against ultimate German intransigence.

Mr. Kennan also deals with the origins of intervention in Siberia and in particular with the compli-



cated relations of these to United States policy towards Japan, and also with the problems presented by the early rise of non-Soviet centers of resistance in Russia proper. But comment on Mr. Kennan's handling of these issues would more properly be reserved until his second volume enables us to see the picture as a whole.

MAX BELOFF

*Nuffield College, Oxford*

DOUGLAS, WILLIAM O. *Russian Journey*. New York, Doubleday, 1956. 255 pp. \$4.50; BISSENETTE, GEORGES. *Moscow Was My Parish*. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1956. 272 pp. \$3.95.

Equipped with a spirit of adventure, a cast-iron constitution and a friendly interest in the ways of strange and primitive peoples, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas has made a number of trips in the mountains, deserts and jungles of Asia. His most recent journey has been to the Soviet Union, where he spent a considerable part of his time in Oriental parts of the country, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, coming in by steamer across the Caspian Sea from Iran.

As a travel narrator Justice Douglas is entertaining, although somewhat superficial and discursive. He took his obligations to Eastern hospitality quite seriously, to the point of swallowing, at the risk of nausea, a sheep's ear which is apparently a gourmet's delicacy in Kazakhstan. He also gulped down camel's milk with some misgivings, and was rewarded by finding that it settled his upset stomach.

Justice Douglas shows himself an indefatigable inquirer, although one sometimes feels that he is trying to cover too broad a field on a basis of too limited experience and background knowledge. Much of his discussion of cultural life seems clearly secondhand; one wonders where he picked up the misleading information that *The Possessed* is one of Dostoevsky's early works.

He also seems to have picked up some questionable information about possible relaxation of Soviet police state rigors, prefaced by such phrases as: "Reforms are brewing . . . There is a distinct movement . . . There is agitation among lawyers and judges . . . There is a drive on . . . Sentiment is building up . . ." There is a considerable suggestion of "pie in the sky" about all this and it may be recalled that both under Lenin and under Stalin there were changes in the name of the political police and alleged curtailment of its powers and functions which proved in the end to have little practical significance.

Justice Douglas is inclined to overwork the word "adequate" in describing Soviet accomplishments in many fields, from food supply to public health. He also ventures a prediction that seems based on a false premise and out of line with probability, such as, "Russian agriculture is making progress and in another decade or two will probably equal ours." Yet according to Soviet statistics per capita consumption of meat, milk, and eggs is lower than it was before the Revolution, almost forty years ago. American agriculture in this period has made tremendous forward strides. Justice Douglas seems to

cast doubts on his own prediction when, on the basis of visits to collective farms, he notes "the lack of incentives and lagging personal interest," the vast bureaucracy, "with everyone spying on everyone else" and the enormously larger number of persons required per acre, compared with the United States. ("Roughly speaking, agricultural Russia *averages* five times the number of people to the acre as America and often has ten times the number of workers per acre.")

He sees the United States as confronted by two alternatives in its policy toward the Soviet Union: to continue the present policy of military preparedness with a stepped-up program of foreign aid or a political truce, involving a disarmament program, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression, and agreement on the status quo which each nation would defend. Justice Douglas prefers the second alternative, to which, however, there would seem to be weighty moral and practical objections. The Soviet government has repeatedly violated treaties of friendship and non-aggression. No promising means of verifying disarmament has been discovered. There is no reason to suppose from past experience that the Soviet government would respect a status quo; and a formal delimitation of United States and Soviet spheres of influence would be calculated to strengthen the Soviet grip on the satellite countries.

Father Bissonnette, an American priest, served for some two years in Moscow as the clergyman permitted to minister to the needs of Americans and other foreigners in Moscow under the Roosevelt-Lit-

vinov Agreement of 1934. His book is simple and unpretentious and offers few broad judgments of Soviet politics and economics. He is most interesting in discussing religion.

He interprets the Russian Orthodox faith as a way of life, rather than a body of doctrine, and finds many of its believers immune to atheistic propaganda which has no effect on their emotional devotion. At the same time four decades of rule by an atheistic government with absolute power have had their effect; there are only fifty churches in Moscow, with a population of six million, now, as against over 400 for a much smaller population before the Revolution. The Soviet policy of cultural strangulation, of denying adequate facilities for printing religious books and training priests, ministers and mullahs has also been detrimental to Christian, Moslem, and Jewish faiths alike.

Like Justice Douglas, Father Bissonnette has traveled widely, and with the advantage of being able to speak fluent Russian. He and Justice Douglas are in agreement on the closed mind attitude of many of the Soviet youth (how far this is a genuine product of indoctrination and how far it may be protective camouflage in talking with a foreigner is hard to say) and also on the generally friendly and helpful attitude of the Soviet citizen toward a foreign visitor. Hate propaganda, carried on so vigorously under Stalin's regime, has left few, if any, visible traces.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN  
*Cambridge, Massachusetts*

GERHART NIEMEYER AND JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR. *An Inquiry Into Soviet Mentality*. New York, Praeger, 1956. 113 pp. \$2.75.

This second volume in the Foreign Policy Research Institute (University of Pennsylvania) series has the stated purpose of raising questions with the intent of starting "a discussion aiming at a thorough reorientation of our thinking habits concerning the phenomena of Soviet policy." The questions raised, and the answers suggested, are of a nature and quality which should provoke discussion. Whether this will accomplish the larger purpose of reorientation remains to be seen. This reviewer hopes that it will.

The study is organized into five chapters plus an appendix, the latter being the work of Professor Reshetar whose major concern in it is with the problems of co-existence and the two camps. He concludes, as does his associate, that there is strong reason to doubt "the essential rationality of the Soviet leadership."

Dr. Niemeyer, having posed the problem, first discusses the criteria of rationality as a basis for judging Soviet mentality. The second chapter applies the tests to Soviet doctrine; the third, to the Soviet regime; and the fourth, to Soviet policy. The final chapter concludes that "'Reasonable communism' is a contradiction in terms," and that it is unwise to expect rationality to control Soviet policy.

Understanding, both in the sense of a settlement and in the sense of a shared meaning, the authors believe to be an impossibility. We and the Soviets not only do not talk the

same language in a semantic sense; we also start from such entirely unlike assumptions and principles as to make the gap between us unbridgeable. Nor can we pin our hopes, as many seem to, on a Soviet version of a managerial revolution because the new rulers, like those they would replace, "... would not be able to dispense with Communist ideology."

This judgment, like many others, can be expected to evoke rather violent disagreement. If the result is a clearer understanding of the nature of Soviet Communism, Drs. Niemeyer and Reshetar will have both fulfilled their stated purpose and served their country well.

WARREN B. WALSH

*Syracuse University*

DEWAR, MARGARET. *Labour Policy in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1928*. London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956. 286 pp. \$6.00.

Margaret Dewar's study presents with objectivity, conciseness, and many important and illuminating details, the development of labor problems and Communist thinking on labor and labor organization in the first decade of Soviet rule. The work is an extraordinarily diligent study which fills a gap in the rather extensive literature on the social and economic development of Soviet Russia, and should be used and studied by many with a feeling of gratitude to the author.

Having said this, it is necessary to point out the limitations of this study. Miss Dewar is more an an-

nalist than an *analyst*. For an analysis of the developments in question she would need a broader knowledge of the Russian labor movement before and during the Revolution. She explains the developments as if the Communists had been the only spokesmen for the working-class from the beginning of the Revolution and even before. This is not the case. It is merely a Communist myth which has influenced many Western studies of Soviet Russia, including the introduction to Miss Dewar's book. In other parts of the book the influence of this myth is not so apparent since the author generally abstains from social and political generalities and sees her task mainly as a factual reporter. At times, however, the author's insufficient knowledge of the real labor movement limits the sharpness of her insight and makes her overlook such facts as the struggle for and against labor autonomy in social insurance — a phenomenon of paramount importance for the understanding of labor development in Russia during the period 1917-19. She explains the frequent changes in policy in the organization of social insurance by "organizational inexperience" and the lack of "an efficient administrative apparatus." (p. 71).

Probably for the same reasons Miss Dewar also underestimates the ideological struggles in the Communist Party in the early years of the Revolution and overlooks some of their implications. Thus, she reports extensively on the great "discussion about trade unions" in 1920-21 which was concluded at the 10th Congress of the Party, in March, 1921, by the approval of a resolu-

tion about the role and the tasks of the trade unions under the conditions of the New Economic Policy, but she fails to mention the principal idea of this resolution: the recognition that trade unions are, in a sense, organizations "for the defense of workers' interests." This became the official trade union theory throughout the N. E. P. period. In order to destroy it, eight years later, the very backbone of Soviet trade unionism was broken.

In the preface to her book Miss Dewar states: "From 1917 to 1928 the basic structure of Soviet labor policy was built up, and there has been no essential modification of it since that time." (p. VII). What happened to the trade unions is the best refutation of this statement. Actually, after the beginning of the Five-Year-Plan era Soviet labor policy was almost entirely remodelled: the wage policy, the labor relations policy, the labor supply policy, the social insurance policy.

It would be regrettable if the readers of this review would conclude from these remarks that the book is useless. It is very useful for every student of the early days of Soviet labor policy, and its usefulness is heightened by an appendix (of 117 pp.) in which are ably presented, in chronological order and in a condensed form, 518 decrees, ordinances, and instructions concerning labor from October 28, 1917, to October 8, 1928, with precise references to the sources in which the full texts of the documents can be found.

SOLOMON M. SCHWARZ  
New York City

OLKHOVSKY, ANDREY. *Music Under the Soviets*. New York, Praeger, 1955. 427 pp. \$6.00.

Among the arts in the Soviet Union, music represents a highly complex and contradictory phenomenon. For a variety of reasons (an analysis of which would transcend the frame of the present review), the policies of the Soviet government have not wrought such sweeping havoc in the field of music as in the other domains of art, such as the theater, the cinema, painting, and, of course, literature.

It is true that the history of Soviet music has been marked by many tragedies of the creative spirit and has gone through many dark periods when it would seem that the flame of creation had been extinguished forever. And yet, whenever the authorities would "loosen the screws" however slightly, be it for a year, be it for only a few months, new scores of fine, sincere music would quickly emerge, and the concert stages would resound with excellent performances of musical works only yesterday prohibited. In the summer of 1951, for instance, one might have thought that Shostakovich had definitely turned into an orthodox, unimpeachable "socialist realist." Yet he only had to attend a Bach festival in Germany to produce his most interesting "Twenty-four Preludes and Fugues for Pianoforte," which aroused a storm of indignation in Party circles because (as one critic put it) "they convey a sensation of the cold and somber vaults of a Gothic cathedral." No sooner was Stalin dead than this same Shostakovich sat down to compose one of his most

significant symphonies (the Tenth), and by the time Beria was executed he had finished it (in the last years of Stalin's rule it had not been advisable for him to compose symphonies).

To those people of the free world who are anxious to grasp the meaning of what goes on in the Communist state, the situation of music presents a particularly difficult problem. Any author who would write a truthful and objective book on Soviet music and thus help to unravel the enigma, would surely have a claim to their gratitude.

Unfortunately, the book under review fails in this task. Instead of clarifying the problem, it makes it appear more confusing than ever. The facts and data the author presents, as well as his conclusions and interpretations, are difficult to reconcile with what Westerners have learned about Soviet music from their own experience. For instance: how are we to understand the triumphant success of the Leningrad Philharmonic orchestra, conducted by Evgeni Mravinsky, at the festival in Vienna, with the desolate picture of Soviet musical life offered by Olkhovsky to his readers? The author goes so far as to lament "the death of the symphony in the Soviet Union" (p. 178).

To begin with, the form of the book shows serious defects. Its organization is chaotic. An abundance of material — facts, quotations, reflections, etc. — is offered without any system or clear plan. The chapter, for instance, on "The Technique of Enslaving Soviet Music" is included in the introductory section (p. 9); but the reader will find the actual record of the unfold-



ing of this "technique" only in the fifth section of the book, in the chapter entitled "The Development of Party Controls" (p. 148). The brief chapter on "The Opera" is carried in the fifth section and takes up no more than two and a half pages; yet a great many separate facts relating to the Soviet opera are interspersed throughout the other sections of the book. This presentation makes it very difficult to trace the historical evolution of Soviet music in chronological order. Characterizations of composers and their works are scattered throughout the book in such a way as to make it hard for the reader to gain a general idea of them.

The basic weakness of Olkhovskiy's book, however, lies in its contents. The book abounds in inaccurate and sometimes outright false statements which impart to it a biased, propagandist character. The author, for instance, gives a harshly negative appraisal of the Soviet system of musical education, while, as a matter of fact, this system represents one of the strongest aspects of cultural life in the Soviet Union. All things considered, it is precisely to this system of numerous fine musical schools, headed by the Moscow State Conservatory, that Soviet music owes the preservation of its creative vitality.

The author's description of the structure of Soviet musical education is inaccurate. All the conservatories, as well as the best of the secondary music schools are controlled not by the Committee for Higher Education (p. 105) but by the Central Department for the Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Culture. The course of

study in the elementary music schools (for non-professional musicians) takes seven years, not four (p. 106). The post-graduate course for the training of conservatory teachers takes not three years (p. 108) but two. No ten-year courses have ever been offered by the conservatories; there exist, however, ten-year music schools for specially gifted children in Moscow, Leningrad, and Odessa, entirely independent of the conservatories in administrative matters. Before the war there existed not nine conservatories but a great many more — and the author forgets to mention those of Saratov, Minsk, Alma-Ata, and Tashkent. While devoting several chapters to the organization of controls over music, he does not even mention the Central Music Department of the Ministry of Culture. The list of similar mistakes and omissions could be extended indefinitely.

While several dozen pages are devoted to Soviet musicology, no mention is made of I. I. Sollertinsky, one of the most distinguished Soviet musicologists, the ideologist of the Association for Modern Music, a fervent admirer and early champion of the young Shostakovich.

Yet the author's chief error lies in his inability, despite his vigorous anti-Communism, to rid himself of the tenets and dogmas of orthodox Soviet musicology. It is this attitude that prompts him, for instance, to extol the musicologist Asafiev (p. 81) and to assert that "the life of this truly outstanding man was an example of spiritual strength and of the stubborn fight for the right to creative independence against the Bolshevik oppression."



The actual facts prove exactly the reverse. Asafiev was a talented writer of music, yet both as a man and as a theorist he was utterly unprincipled. He was one of those who helped Zhdanov to prepare and to find "scientific" arguments for the notorious decree of the Central Committee "On the Opera 'The Great Friendship' by V. Muradeli" (February 10, 1948), the cruelest blow dealt to Soviet music in all the years of the Soviet rule. In recognition of this "service" Asafiev was appointed Chairman of the Union of Soviet Composers — and this took place in February, 1948, at the blackest moment in the history of Soviet music! At the first convention of the composers, in April, 1948, the assembly had to listen to the reading of a report written by Asafiev that was a matchless example of demagoguery, falsehood, and servility.

It is evident that the author has not availed himself fully of the Western conditions of intellectual freedom and has not attempted a critical reappraisal of the ideological equipment he has brought with him. Ever faithful to the schematism of Soviet musicology, he keeps talking of "groups" and "schools" of composers, where in reality there existed only profoundly different individuals. Again and again he writes of the "big three," Shostakovich, Prokofiev, and Miaskovsky, ascribing common features to these immensely different musicians (to say nothing of the fact that Miaskovsky, with his rather limited gifts, cannot be placed on the same level with the other two, who are among the truly great composers of our century).

Olkhovsky would do well to give up the theories and conceptions of Soviet musicology and to try to "hear" afresh the music of Soviet composers. As he now writes, he gives the impression of never having really heard much of what he talks about and of having forgotten much of what he had heard in the past. Were it not so, he could not have spoken of the "over-emotional lyricism" of the Fifth Symphony of Shostakovich (p. 201). There are few symphonies so utterly devoid of any kind of lyricism as Shostakovich's Fifth. The dominant mood of this tragic creation is one of despair, horror, and bitter derision.

The author opens his book with the sentence: "The historical destinies of the arts are not accidental. Like life itself, they are subject to definite laws." These words, in essence, restate a basic principle of historical materialism.

It would be a good thing for Olkhovsky to free himself quickly from his materialistic way of thought. He would then gain a much deeper and more objective understanding of the true meaning of events in the creative life of Soviet Russia. And the essence of art would then be revealed to him cleansed of political bias and propagandist dogma.

JURI JELAGIN

Houston, Texas

HEILBRUNN, OTTO. *The Soviet Secret Services*. New York, Praeger, 1956. 216 pp. \$4.50.

Recently, Sir Anthony Eden was engaged in, an exchange with a back-bencher in Commons. "I much prefer," said the Prime Minister, "what has been called the menace

of Soviet competition to the threat of world war." At the same time the diplomatic correspondent of a major newspaper was expressing concern over this period of "neither war nor peace," the resulting free world complacency, and the comparative failure of Congress to provide ample funds for our intelligence and psychological warfare agencies, especially since Moscow and Peiping place such great store in these media.

It is with this time of smug comfort that Dr. Heilbrunn is mainly concerned. Drawing upon the Second World War's widely extended Soviet espionage activities in western Europe he writes of Soviet infiltration, espionage, guerilla warfare and subversion (with some vivid chapters on the Nazi apparatus) which is, he reminds us, "war without a battlefield, a war in which the outcome of a battle or campaign may be decided before the battle is joined."

"Intelligence," said a general some years ago, "is what my side has. The enemy has the spies." This, it seems, is what Dr. Heilbrunn, who once served as an Assistant Counsel at the Nuremberg trials and later worked for the British during the Manstein trial, argues. In effect, he is telling the West to be practical and above all, realistic. "We must . . . be prepared to make use of the entire arsenal," and "we, too, must have partisans"; are the essence of his thesis.

These, then, are the broad findings of an uneven, occasionally forceful book that is frequently dull because of its largely familiar material and an overly exhortive style. There is also, unfortunately, a complete absence of the dramatic im-

pact in the retelling of international undercover work which is found in say, Willoughby's *Shanghai Conspiracy* or Dallin's *Soviet Espionage*, the latter especially, a much more telling and complete study. Dr. Heilbrunn, moreover, has a penchant for the grand generalization. "Religion," he tells us, "is the only antidote to the immorality of Marxism" and, "Had Hitler died on July 20, 1944, and the resistance movement taken over, the Soviets might have succeeded" [in achieving a Red Germany]. These judgments would appear most questionable. Suffice to say there are more than a few anti-Communists who have other remedies for the poison and that the July 20th plotters were largely political conservatives. A more balanced understanding of their role can be found in Fitz Gibbon's 20 JULY.

The book is on firmer ground when it discusses the story of the betrayal of France by the French Communists in 1940. Simply stated, they were traitors, and as careful a scholar as Rossi has concluded that Party propagandists broadcast their programs and published their broadsheets from Nazi soil. How did it come about that the Germans promoted Communist propaganda against Hitler? It appears that they realized that since there were no Communists to speak of in Germany who could carry out such propaganda any damage the Reds could do to the French was more than welcome. Thorez, Marty, and Duclos as well as the Nazi hierarchy knew this and they "joyfully collaborated in a gigantic hoax." The French Communist, even if a bit appalled at this arrangement, was "told that German

fellow-workers were fighting against Hitlerism — their enemy within — and that his own task was solely to fight against his enemy within."

There is some information included on Draja Mihailovitch, who was, after all, acclaimed a traitor to Tito by Tito. An interesting appendix also adds more documentation to the annals of Soviet espionage by including the controversial Protocol "M," which states the alleged Cominform plan for conquest of Western Germany.

George Orwell said it best when he told of Communist treachery during the Spanish Civil War. Non-Communists, he wrote, who cared as little for commissars as they did for caudillos, were murdered. Outside of Spain, far from the screams of the dying, popular fronters, then in the first flush of enthusiasm, were loathe to believe that their new comrades could have committed such deeds. Perhaps, then, the chief advantage in reading Dr. Heilbrunn's book is its forceful reminder that the Party hasn't changed, despite what advocates of a revived popular front assert. Those soothing winds from the East still have an odor of burning flesh. To believe anything else is an invitation to suicide.

MURRAY POLNER

*Columbia University*

SMITH, JR., JAY C. *The Russian Struggle for Power: 1914-1917. A Study of Russian Foreign Policy During the First World War.* New York, Philosophical Library, 1956. 553 pp. \$4.75.

The present generation seems to

have forgotten the diplomacy of the First World War in which, incidentally, Imperial Russia played no small part. In spite of accumulating published documents that invite a revision of firmly-held views, the dominant themes of the current historical writings remain those pertaining to more recent developments. The present study is a welcome departure from the prevailing tendency and represents a much-desired addition to historical literature. It endeavors to present a detailed account of diplomatic developments during the few but fateful years, 1914-17.

The work consists of seven chapters, covering such vital and inter-related subjects as general diplomatic designs on the eve of the conflict, the complex issues pertaining to the Balkan states, the everlasting question of the Straits and the spoliation of Turkey, the perplexing problem of Poland, the entrance of Italy and Rumania into the war, and concludes with the decline and fall of the entire "Grand Design" of Russia's war diplomacy. The last chapter is devoted to the diplomacy of the Provisional Government. Though concise it succeeds in presenting adequately the bewildering legacy which this government was compelled to deal with. The overwhelming impression given from the entire story is the inveterate nature of many of the problems that frustrated the statesmen of the time; it compels one to wonder whether war settles or only aggravates national aspirations.

Contrary to some early assertions, Professor Smith begins with the admission that the First World War was not instigated by Russia

in order to gain Constantinople and the Straits. This was at one time a popular theme of the pro-German school of writers who were prone to place most of the guilt upon Izvolsky and others as the chief warmongers. To be certain, the author never minimizes the importance of the Straits to Russia and he illustrates it by the often-cited episode of the closure of the Straits during the war of 1912. Here, however, he is somewhat carried away by the example, stating that due to the brief period of this closure Russian grain growers suffered a loss of thirty billion rubles a month. Since the entire national budget of that year was approximately five billion rubles, the figure cited is obviously exaggerated and calls for correction. Nor is the statement concerning illiteracy in Russia on the eve of 1914 correct: 60 per cent is a figure that has been convincingly refuted by many scholars. The figure of 45 per cent is closer to the real state of affairs.

At times the author tends to oversimplify and overgeneralize certain complex historical developments. To say that the cause of the Crimean War was the hatred of British liberals for Nicholas I is too simple an explanation for a complex event. Professor Smith believes that the old theory that British foreign policy was centered solely on opposition to Russia's claim to Constantinople and the Straits is a mere legend. A more careful study of nineteenth-century British diplomacy, he asserts, easily dispels this legend. "Actually," states the author, "in 1840-41, the British were as much interested in saving Turkey from France as from Russia." This seems in part, at least,

a confirmation of the "legend" rather than its refutation. Surely Britain's participation in the Crimean War, her success in attaining a "peace with honor" at the Congress of Berlin (and, incidentally, Cyprus!), and the tearing up of the San Stefano Treaty was not achieved solely for the sake of "saving" Turkey. A little further, while explaining the pro-Russian attitude of the British government during the First World War, the author unwittingly lets the cat out of the bag when he states that London consented to Russia's claim to Constantinople and the Straits, provided "Russia behaved well in regard to Persia." This is a remarkable qualification indeed!

Professor Smith's work is based predominantly on diplomatic source material which has appeared in recent years. Yet one has an inescapable feeling that there is more to the story than the mere records and dispatches of what the author calls "frock-coated diplomats." On several occasions the author also notes that there was no unity of opinion among Russian statesmen concerning war aims.

The purpose of the Gallipoli campaign, Professor Smith observes, was not only to deliver munitions through the Straits and maintain better lines of communications, but "rather, it was the maintenance of British supremacy on the high seas." Here is the story in a nutshell and there is little wonder that at St. Petersburg many frowned upon this operation, regarding it as contrary to Russia's aspirations and in conflict with the solemn pledges of the Allies to support Russia's aims in the Near East. The picture of haggling diplomacy

while blood was generously shed at the frontiers is presented in such detail that it produces a painful impression. Those who see the First World War only as a conflict aimed at ending all wars and making democracy safe for the future should read the sobering account of Professor Smith.

The entire narrative is presented in a somewhat pedestrian style popularly known as the "doctoral dissertation style." Only occasionally does the author attempt to soften the stylistic dullness by embellishing sentences with florid adjectives such as: "sonorous oratory," "feeble Goremykin," "aged relic," "haemophilic son," "lecherous charlatans," "pathetic puppet." Here and there one comes across a touch of fictional style when he describes "the sound of Prussian jack-boots goose-stepping" or the "lengthy and inane babblings" of diplomats, or, "the bells tolled and onion-shaped domes gleamed in the August sun," and "the Messiah of Communism and his prophets already in the wings."

These criticisms should not give one the impression of a caviling reviewer. Despite certain failings Professor Smith's book deserves to become part of the essential equipment of the historian. The author crowds into his pages an impressive amount of detail and the main achievement of this study is a revision of certain views that had been considered final. This in itself is a commendable achievement and merits honorable mention.

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR

*Stanford University*

UNTERBERGER, BETTY MILLER.

*America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920.* Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1956. 271 pp. \$7.50.

The dispatch of Allied military forces to Russia in 1918 is an event that has now inspired a considerable and interesting literature. Each of the major participating nations has contributed a share of this output. Soviet Russia, as one might expect, has produced the greatest quantity of documents, books, and articles. Since the Second World War the Stalinist anti-American orthodoxy has stimulated a fresh spate of writing on the subject. Its general tone is exemplified by the title of A. V. Berezkin's *USA-Active Organizer and Participant in Military Intervention against Soviet Russia, 1918-1920*. Moscow, 1952. Japan, until recently the chief objective of Soviet attack as the instigator of the intervention, has written surprisingly little about the affair considering how vital it was to her. In fact, it seems to have been precisely because it was so vital that many felt it wise to avoid it. Recently, however, a young professor at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, Chihiro Hosoya, has taken up the cudgels for the Japanese side. His first volume, *An Historical Study of the Siberian Expedition* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1955, deals with the origins of the intervention.

In the United States the Second World War seems to have aroused a greater interest in the intervention than ever before. The first five years after the war found a considerable number of these studies in process. The reason for this



renewed interest was probably both the forceful posture that Russia had by then assumed in world affairs as well as the striking parallel to the then current situation in China, where, as in Russia in 1918, the Western nations found themselves supporting a conservative government against a dynamic revolutionary regime. It is characteristic of many of these studies that have been published and made available for examination that they deal largely with American interests in the intervention. There is, on the one hand, little use of Russian or Japanese sources either to broaden the scope of the study or to answer or refute ideas expressed in these sources that might have a bearing on the American interests. Furthermore, since many of these studies were being carried out almost simultaneously, there was little opportunity for even a minimum of cross-fertilization of ideas and viewpoints. While the writers are not to be held accountable for this more or less accidental factor, it is nevertheless of considerable importance in weighing their product. For it is in this perspective that Mrs. Unterberger's book must be seen. It seems to have been written during the same half decade after the war, before any of the studies then in process had yet been published.

*America's Siberian Expedition* deals almost exclusively with the diplomacy of the American military expedition. One might describe it as the counterpart in diplomatic history of General Graves' excellent personal and military account, *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920*, for its sources are largely American diplomatic documents,

notes and memoranda, some published, many unpublished. The book proceeds from a brief introduction through the long and involved Allied negotiations aimed principally at gaining President Wilson's consent to the intervention. The author then turns to the harassing problems which the kaleidoscopic Russian scene presented such as railways, the Cossack protégés of the Japanese, the antagonism between the various Russian factions in Siberia, the expansive Japanese ambitions, and the difficulty of getting the Japanese out of Siberia. It concludes with the double finale, first of the evacuation of all the Allied forces except those of Japan; and secondly of the withdrawal, two years later, of the Japanese forces and of the Allied railway administration headed by the well-known American engineer, John Stevens. The book is thoroughly documented, written in a readable style, and carefully edited.

The intervention is one of the most important events of the past half century. Furthermore, it was an aspect of one of the key events of modern times, the Russian Revolution. The author's story of the American expedition would have been used to better advantage. Admiral Kolchak may have been a small man, but the role in which he was cast was immensely important. The reader would see the intervention in better perspective if he knew that Kolchak's failure was in a very real sense the tragedy of the intervention and of the Russian nation. Also, since the American expedition was admittedly inspired by the need to watch the expansive Japanese, it is important to know why the Japanese were so insistent



upon sending an expeditionary force to Siberia. Even where, as in this case, one concentrates on a single aspect of a subject, these are not extraneous matters. They are the kinds of clues that give meaning and perspective to such a study.

JOHN ALBERT WHITE

*University of Hawaii*

ROZANOV, VASILII. *Selected Works*.

Ed. by Dr. George Ivask. New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1956. 412 pp. \$3.00.

Vasilii Rozanov (1856-1919) can be considered as one of the major literary figures of what is called "the Russian Renaissance," which started in the '90s and came to a premature end during the Revolution of 1917. A former provincial teacher of history turned journalist who wrote for conservative papers and, under a pseudonym, for a liberal one, as well as the husband of Dostoevsky's mistress, Rozanov fascinated critics with his ideas on sex and religion, his criticism of Christianity and his highly original prose. Evaluations of his writings were as contradictory as his personality, but nearly everybody stressed Rozanov's unusual literary gifts. For D. S. Mirsky, he was "the greatest writer of his generation."

It is hardly surprising that Rozanov's name was seldom mentioned in Russia during the last forty years, his works and personality being absolutely uncongenial with the new, post-revolutionary order. Nevertheless, one cannot agree with the statement in the preface to the present edition of his works, calling Rozanov "a forgotten writer." In

exile, he was read, published, discussed, and remained an influence. If he remained almost totally unknown to the Western reader, the fault is probably that of the translators, who are to be pitied, not blamed, for their inability to find a foreign equivalent to Rozanov's subjective, subtle prose with its inimitable intonation.

The appearance of his *Selected Works* in Russian is, therefore, a welcome event. It not merely gives us an opportunity to re-evaluate Rozanov, but it also supplies us with texts which for a long time were out of print. Its appearance might also inspire someone to try a new translation of his works.

The present edition attempts to represent Rozanov by as many of his works as possible, which in itself is praiseworthy, but makes the volume look like an anthology. One would rather wish such important (and unavailable) works as *The Moonlight Men* appear in full and not in short excerpts. But his best works, *Solitary Thoughts* and *Fallen Leaves*, are only slightly shortened, and do not suffer materially thereby, being written in the form of a collection of fragments. Rozanov's last work, *The Apocalypse of Our Time*, is also included.

While re-reading Rozanov, one cannot help thinking how astonishingly "modern" this writer is. His thoughts on sex may be far removed from those of Freud and too "oriental" for many a Western reader to create a following (as they did in pre-revolutionary Russia), but most of his writings on religious problems, with their existentialist overtones, could become a subject for interesting discussions, if only they were known.

However, it is as an artist that Rozanov commands our attention first of all and it is the originality of his style that gives him such an important place in Russian literature. His prose, with its virtuosity of expression, frankness of thought, and a conversational naturalness of inflection, is unlike anything else in Russian letters and deserves a special study.

Dr. George Ivask's preface to the book is an excellent introduction to Rozanov. It gives more biographical data on the writer than any other source. The presentation of Rozanov's ideas is thorough and objective, the analysis of his style, concise and exhaustive.

V. M.

*Monterey, California*

# WORLD POLITICS

*A Quarterly Journal of International Relations*

Under the Editorial Sponsorship of the

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

PRINCETON, UNIVERSITY

WORLD POLITICS — Vol. IX, No. 2 — January 1957

## Articles

- Varieties of Worldly Wisdom ..... By C. A. W. MANNING  
Economic Growth, Coercion, and Freedom ..... By KARL DE SCHWEINITZ JR.  
Paris from EDC to WEU ..... By NATHAN LEITES and CHRISTIAN DE LA MALENE  
The Davies Mission and United States-Soviet Relations,  
1937-1941 ..... By RICHARD H. ULLMAN

## Review Articles (a special feature of World Politics)

- In Praise of Political Science ..... By CHARLES E. LINDBLOM  
Progress in the Theory of Economic Progress ..... By TIBOR SCITOVSKY  
On Universal History ..... By E. HARRIS HARBISON  
On Comparative History ..... By BERT F. HOSELITZ  
A New Future for World War II? ..... By BRIGADIER GENERAL S. F. GIFFIN, USAF  
Africa: Scholarship and Policy ..... By LLOYD A. FALLERS  
The Crisis of Modern Socialism ..... By KURT L. SHELL

Subscriptions \$6.00 a year, (two years, \$10.00), single copies, \$2.00

Address: WORLD POLITICS

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, BOX 231, Princeton, N. J.

## Statement Required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as Amended by the Acts of March 3, 1933, and July 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) Showing the Ownership, Management, and Circulation

OF THE RUSSIAN REVIEW published quarterly at Hanover, N. H., additional entry  
Deep River, Conn., for November 8, 1956.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher, The Russian Review, Inc., 235 Baker Library, Hanover, N. H.; Editor, Dimitri von Mohrenschildt, 235 Baker Library, Hanover, N. H.; Managing editor, none; Business manager, none.

2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given.)  
The Russian Review, Inc., 235 Baker Library, Hanover, N. H. Voluntary, non-stock corporation.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (if there are none, so state.) None.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT

Editor

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 26th day of September, 1956.

INEZ M. KELLAM, Notary Public.

(My commission expires April 17, 1958)

# HISTORICAL ABSTRACTS

1775-1945

*A quarterly journal (in English) of abstracts of historical articles  
appearing currently in periodicals the world over*

Vol. III

1957

ERIC H. BOEHM, *Editor*

## ADVISORY BOARD

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <i>A. Appadorai</i> , New Delhi, India                                  | <i>Alberto M. Ghisalberti</i> , University of Rome   |
| <i>Frederick C. Barghoorn</i> , Yale University                         | <i>Hugo Hantsch</i> , Vienna University              |
| <i>Woodbridge Bingham</i> , University of California                    | <i>William L. Langer</i> , Harvard University        |
| <i>George B. Carson, Jr.</i> , University of Chicago                    | <i>Hans Rothfels</i> , Tübingen University           |
| <i>Chao Kuo-chün</i> , Cornell University                               | <i>Bruce L. Smith</i> , Michigan State College       |
| <i>Juan Comas</i> , Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, Mexico, D. F. | <i>Mario Toscano</i> , University of Rome            |
| <i>Aileen Dunham</i> , Wooster College                                  | <i>George Vernadsky</i> , Yale University            |
| <i>Jean B. Duroselle</i> , Universities of Paris and of Saarbrücken     | <i>Sir Charles K. Webster</i> , University of London |
|   | <i>Tatsuro Yamamoto</i> , Tokyo University           |

## CONTENTS

Abstracts of articles on political, diplomatic, economic, social, cultural and intellectual history. Also: World List of Historical Periodicals (cumulative), Bibliographical News, Notes and News of the Profession, Author Index, Subject Index.

The first volume contained 3,600 abstracts, representing a search of more than 500 periodicals. Vol. II covers more than 700 periodicals from all parts of the world, and coverage is being steadily extended.

---

*Sample copies on request  
from*

HISTORICAL ABSTRACTS, c/o HISTORISCHES SEMINAR  
UNIVERSITÄT WIEN, VIENNA I, AUSTRIA

---

## **ADAM MICKIEWICZ in World Literature**

EDITED BY WACLAW LEDNICKI

The influence of the famous Polish poet on world literature described by American and European scholars in honor of the centennial of his death.

**\$7.50**

## **Pushkin's BRONZE HORSEMAN**

The Story of a Masterpiece

BY WACLAW LEDNICKI

The role that Mickiewicz and others played in the artistic composition and ideological content of Pushkin's poem.

Paper, **\$2.50**

## **The MOSCOW KREMLIN**

Its History, Architecture, and Art Treasures

BY ARTHUR VOYCE

"... the first modern account in English of one of the wonders of the world." —*The Observer*

"... a work of thorough scholarship, warm esthetic appreciation, and deep feeling for Russia's history." —*New York Times Book Review*

"... This attractive and finely-produced book should appeal to students of Russian history as much as to lovers of art and architecture." —*Illustrated London News*

**\$10.00**

## **The Political Theory of BOLSHEVISM**

A Critical Analysis

BY HANS KELSEN

Shows the paradoxical contradiction which exists within Bolshevism between anarchism in theory and totalitarianism in practice, and defines the true idea of democracy against the attempt to obliterate or to adulterate it by presenting a party dictatorship as the political self-determinism of a free people.

Paper, **\$1.25**

---

*University of California Press*

Address:  
Berkeley 4, California

---

